Supplementary Materials for

"Which citizens do elected officials target with distributive spending?
A survey experiment on US municipal officials"

Adam M. Dynes
April 1, 2020

Contents

A: Details of the 2012 Survey of Elected Municipal Officials

The questions and survey experiments analyzed in the paper were administered online to a randomly selected subsample of participants in the 2012 American Municipal Officials Survey (AMOS), a survey of elected municipal officials from across the US conducted by Daniel Butler and Adam Dynes (www.municipalsurvey.org). The sample of city officials for the survey was constructed by first obtaining a list of 26,566 municipalities from the U.S. Census Bureau.[1] We defined municipalities as general-purpose local governments using the following categorizations from the Census Bureau:

- **Incorporated Places.** In most states, they are called cities, towns, boroughs, and villages.
- **Consolidated Cities.** These are a ``unit of government for which the functions of an Incorporated Place and its county or Minor Civil Divisions have merged."[2]
- **Minor Civil Divisions (MCDs)** in CT, ME, MA, MI, MN, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT, and WI. In these states, they are usually called townships or towns. I included Minor Civil Divisions from these states based on the Census Bureau's assessment that "Most of the MCDs in [these] twelve states … serve as general-purpose local governments that can perform the same governmental functions as incorporated places."[3]

Student research assistants then searched for the website of each municipality on this list in random order. If the research assistants were able to identify the city website, they then collected the name and email address of the elected executive (i.e., mayor) and elected members of the governing legislative body (e.g., city councilors). The survey itself was created using the web-based program Qualtrics and was administered to municipal officials by emailing them a link to the survey. Each official received three email invitations, sent 2 to 3 weeks apart.

Overall, the survey had a response rate of 23 percent, on par with recent expert surveys of this nature (e.g., Fisher and Herrick 2013; Harden 2013) and double the typical response rate for contemporary telephone surveys of the mass public. As illustrated in figures A1 and A2, participants in AMOS 2012 provide broad geographic coverage across the United States.

There were thus three types of municipalities: (1) municipalities that did not have a website with email addresses available,[4] (2) municipalities that did have emails listed but where no official accepted the invitation to take the survey, and (3) municipalities where at least one of the officials took the survey.[5] Table A1 provides the descriptive statistics on the characteristics of these three types of municipalities. The most striking difference is that the elected officials in the survey were from systematically larger cities than those who did not have respondents or emails. The median municipality for which I could not find any email addresses had a population of only 856 people. Given that the median American lives in a city with a population of about 60,000, the respondents to the surveys skewed in the direction of the types of cities where most Americans live.

---

[1] Specifically, AMOS 2012 relied on the Census Bureau's ``Subcounty Resident Population Estimates: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009," which was released on September 2010.

[2] U.S. Census Bureau. 2012. ``Geographic Terms and Concepts – County Subdivision", http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_cousub.html (January 9, 2014).

[3] Ibid.

[4] The decision to restrict the sample to city officials with email addresses meant that I also excluded some large cities that provided a contact forms in lieu of email addresses.

[5] If any of the emailed officials responded, the municipality is placed in this category. Thus the response rate "by city" appears to be greater than the response rate by emailed official.

Figure A4: No. of Municipal Officials Participating in Survey by State



Notes: Darker shades indicate that a larger number of respondents came from that state. The actual number from the state is given in the center of each state on the map.

Figure A5: Response Rate by State – 2012 Survey of Elected Municipal Officials



Notes: Darker shades indicate a higher response rate in the state. The actual number from the state is given in the center of each state on the map.

Table A1: Details on Cities in the 2012 National Municipal Official Survey

	Cities without Emails	Cities with Emails but No Respondents	Cities with Respondents
Number of Cities	21,889	1,992	3,109
Population (in thousands)			
Mean	3.8	17.9	36.9
Median	.9	4.5	10.2
Total	83,672	35,735	114,832
Number of Elected Officials			
Mean		5.6	6.6
Median		6	7
% of Elected Officials w/ Posted Email			
Mean		75%	92%
Median		100%	100%
Type of Municipality			
% Incorporated Place	71%	76%	81%
% Consolidated City	0%	0%	0%
% Minor Civil Division	29%	24%	19%
Form of Government			
(% of these w/ town meetings)			
% Mayor-Council	61% (2%)	58% (0%)	52% (0%)
% Manager-Council	10% (14%)	23% (8%)	33% (5%)
% Selectmen/Supervisors	27% (76%)	18% (79%)	14% (78%)
% Commission	2% (11%)	2% (12%)	1% (18%)
Demographics (Mean)			
Median Income (2012$)	$44,119	$51,813	$58,393
% Black	8%	11%	9%
% Latino	6%	11%	11%
% w/ Some College	20%	20%	20%
% Unemployed	4%	4%	4%
% w/ Unpaid 1st Mortgage	16%	17%	18%
% w/ Unpaid 2nd Mortgage	1%	1%	1%

Figure A3 shows the distribution of the population (on a logarithmic scale) for these three types of cities. The pattern clearly shows that the sample is skewed towards larger cities (though it covers cities of all sizes).

Figure A3: Density Distribution for Cities by Response Type



To further examine the representativeness of the sample, in Table A2 I compare respondents to the sampling frame (the complete list of officials whose emails I gathered and invited to participate in the survey) on individual-level characteristics that I have on both sets of municipal officials---their gender (based on their first name and social security records) and their title. For simplicity, I show the 25 most common titles among officials from each sampling frame. The ``Diff." columns show the percentage point difference between the respondents and sampling frame. Generally, the sampling frame and sample look quite similar. The biggest difference is the higher response rate among mayors compared to council members.

Table A2: Comparing Respondents to Sampling Frame on Gender and Title

	% of Respondents	% of Sampling Frame	Difference
Gender			
Female	28.6	26.8	1.8
Title (Top 25)			
Council Member	35	37.3	-2.4
Mayor	16	12.5	3.5
Councilmember	9.2	9.1	0.1
Trustee	5.4	6.1	-0.7
Alderman	4.6	5.6	-1.0
Councilman	3.2	3.5	-0.3
Commissioner	3.4	3	0.5
Supervisor	2.8	2.5	0.4
Mayor Pro Tem	1.5	1.6	-0.2
Councilor	1.4	1.5	-0.1
Clerk	1.7	1.3	0.4
President	1.2	1.3	0
Vice Mayor	1.2	1.3	-0.1
Selectman	1.5	1.1	0.4
Treasurer	0.6	0.7	-0.1
Council President	0.6	0.7	-0.1
Alderperson	0.5	0.6	-0.2
Deputy Mayor	0.5	0.6	-0.1
Chairman	0.6	0.5	0.1
Councilwoman	1.5	0.5	1.0
Vice President	0.3	0.4	-0.1
Councillor	0.2	0.4	-0.1
Board Member	0.3	0.3	0
Councilmember-At-Large	0.2	0.3	-0.1
Mayor Pro-Tem	1.5	0.3	1.2

Note: This table compares respondents to the sampling frame (the complete list of officials whose emails I gathered and invited to participate in the survey) on individual-level characteristics that I have on both sets of municipal officials---their gender (based on their first name and social security records) and their title. For simplicity, I show the 25 most common titles among officials from each sampling frame. The ``Diff." columns show the percentage point difference between the respondents and sampling frame.

B: Respondents' Feedback to the Survey

At the end of the survey, respondents were asked to provide feedback. This feedback allows me to address potential concerns that readers may have with some of my research design choices. Overall, 36% of respondents to the survey experiment provided some written feedback. I have coded their responses to identify their concerns and critiques about the survey. Table A3 provides an overview of the overall comments and whether they expressed positive or negative sentiments about the survey. Table A4 provides more detailed results of the coding. In summary, 6% of the respondents said at least one thing positive about the survey (almost always in very general terms) while 21% mentioned at least one negative item or criticism about the survey. 2% provided a negative comment about this vignette in particular while another 2% mentioned something negative about any vignette in general or specifically other vignettes (there were two other vignettes for other projects in this wave of the survey).

Table A3: Positive vs. Negative Feedback from Respondents

Positive vs. Negative Feedback	%
Provided any feedback	33.3%
At least 1 negative comment	20.6%
About any vignette	4.3%
About vignette in paper	2.1%
At least 1 positive comment	5.5%
At least 1 positive and 1 negative comment	1.8%
No positive or negative comment	9.1%

Note: These categories are not exclusive since some officials provided both negative and positive feedback.

Table A4: Percent of Respondents Mentioning the Following Items in their Feedback

Specific Topics of Feedback	%
Non-Negative Feedback	
Thanks for conducting survey	1.5%
Request to see results	2.3%
Positive about survey in general	5.2%
Positive about vignettes in general	0.4%
Positive about vignette in paper	0.0%
Negative Feedback	
Disliked survey in general	0.5%
Survey length	1.1%
Welfare issue questions	1.3%
Issue position questions	7.1%
Forced choice answers	10.7%
Needed more information to answer question	2.8%
Not applicable to small cities	0.7%
Not applicable to their experience	0.4%
Too much focus on political/electoral considerations	1.0%
No allowance for compromise in answers	0.4%
Negative Feedback about Vignettes in general	
Disliked in general without any details	0.4%
Needed more info to make choice	1.2%
Forced choice answers	0.5%
Focus on electoral considerations	0.1%
Not applicable to experience	0.1%
Critical of vignettes not in paper	0.6%
Negative Feedback Specifically about Vignette in Paper	
Disliked in general without any details	0.4%
Needed more info to make choice	0.6%
Forced choice answers	0.2%
Focus on electoral considerations	1.2%
Does not apply to at-large city councils	0.1%
Does not reflect actual budget process	0.5%
Does not consider effects of term limits on electoral incentives	0.1%
City does not provide road repair	0.0%
Turnout is too low or too high in treatment condition	0.0%
Disliked set up with campaign manager	0.1%

Note: These categories and items are not exclusive since an individual official may have commented on several items in their feedback.

C: Regression Results

Table A5: Summary Statistics of Control Variables Used in Regressions Below

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Individual Level					
Is Mayor (1=yes)	808	0.24	0.43	0	1
Position is full-time (1=yes)	808	0.12	0.33	0	1
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)	821	0.08	0.27	0	1
Is more ambitious (1=yes)	821	0.41	0.49	0	1
Years served in position	814	6.15	5.24	0	36
Plans to serve 6+ years more (1=yes)	821	0.28	0.45	0	1
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs. (1=yes)	821	0.19	0.39	0	1
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)	809	4.30	1.56	1	7
Is white (1=yes)	821	0.91	0.28	0	1
Risk Aversion, 0 to 1 where 1=total risk aversion	812	0.32	0.19	0	1
Municipal Level					
City Population (in 1,000's)	821	53	327	126	8,391
Log of City Population	821	9.38	1.61	4.8	15.9
Number of Seats on Council	821	6.76	3.93	0	51
Elections are partisan (1=yes)	788	0.24	0.42	0	1
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)	734	0.23	0.42	0	1
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)	673	0.61	0.49	0	1
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)	784	0.43	0.50	0	1
Commissioner Form (1=yes)	784	0.11	0.32	0	1
Council-Manager Form (1=yes)	784	0.45	0.50	0	1

NOTE: These are summary statistics for control variables for the 821 respondents who participated in study 1 (Figure 1) or study 2 (Figure 6). Not all respondents answered each of the questions used to measure the individual level control variables. In addition, I were not able to find all of the municipal level control variables for all respondents, which is why the number of observations is sometimes below 821. The variable "Is more ambitious (1=yes)" indicates officials who expressed ambition for higher office (i.e., they stated a 75% or higher chance of running for higher office within 5 years) or the combined years that they have been in this office or plan to be in it exceeds 12.

Table A6: Risk Aversion and Targeting Core over Swing (Hypothesis 2.1; Regression using data from Panel A of Figure 1)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Risk Aversion, 0 to 1=total risk aversion	0.04	0.07	0.18	0.19	0.26
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		-0.06	0.00	-0.01	-0.07
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		0.04	0.02	-0.00	0.06
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		0.02	-0.04	-0.04	0.01
		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		-0.09	-0.11^		-0.14^
		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)
Years served in position				0.01	
				(0.01)	
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				-0.17*	
				(0.07)	
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				-0.12	
				(0.08)	
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04^
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Is white (1=yes)		-0.09	-0.12	-0.14	-0.10
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Log of City Population			0.03	0.03	0.02
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Number of Seats on Council			0.00	0.00	0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			-0.12	-0.11	-0.15^
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					-0.06
					(0.08)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			0.02	0.02	-0.05
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Constant	0.42**	0.48**	0.16	0.14	0.19
	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.35)
Observations	307	294	249	249	214
R-squared	0.000	0.014	0.046	0.069	0.076

Note: This table shows the pooled results from Panel A of Figure 1 with control variables. The dependent variable is whether the official chose the core neighborhood (DV=1) over the swing neighborhood (DV=0). Risk aversion was measured on a 10 point scale that was converted to 0 to 1, where higher numbers indicate more risk aversion. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A7: Are respondents more uncertain when evaluating the behavior of swing voters? (Hypothesis 2.2)

Statement being evaluated:	(1) Increases Recipient's Vote for Mr. Smith	(2) Increases Recipient's Vote for Mr. Smith	(3) Increases Recipient's Turnout	(4) Increases Recipient's Turnout
Treatment: evaluate swing=1, evaluate core=0	0.011	-0.060	-0.059	-0.119
	[0.049311]	[0.061183]	[0.048924]	[0.061042]^
Chose Core in Pt. 1=1, Chose Swing in Pt. 1=0		-0.071		-0.017
		[0.064527]		[0.064379]
Treatment*Chose Core		0.158		0.080
		[0.092858]^		[0.092645]
Constant	0.291	0.222	0.318	0.244
	[0.034205]**	[0.041971]**	[0.033937]**	[0.041875]**
Observations	345	300	345	300
R-squared	0.000	0.010	0.004	0.014

Statement being evaluated:	(5) Decreases Recipient's Vote for Mr. Smith	(6) Decreases Recipient's Vote for Mr. Smith	(7) Non-Recipient Finds Out	(8) Non-Recipient Finds Out
Treatment: evaluate swing=1, evaluate core=0	0.015	0.017	-0.022	-0.024
	[0.047782]	[0.057589]	[0.049015]	[0.061862]
Chose Core in Pt. 1=1, Chose Swing in Pt. 1=0		0.006		-0.009
		[0.062853]		[0.067516]
Treatment*Chose Core		0.024		0.017
		[0.087404]		[0.093889]
Constant	0.259	0.150	0.301	0.213
	[0.034418]**	[0.041902]**	[0.035306]**	[0.045011]**
Observations	345	300	345	300
R-squared	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001

Standard errors in brackets

^ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Note: Dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 when a respondent provided an "uncertain" response when evaluating the likelihood that the statements in part 2 would be true and 0 otherwise.

C.1: Regression Results for Figure 1

Table A8: Core v. Swing: Pooled Results from Panel A of Figure 1 with Control Variables (Hypotheses 1 and 2)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Neighborhood 1 is swing (1=yes)	0.15*	0.15*	0.15*	0.16*	0.13^
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.03
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		0.02	-0.06	-0.09	-0.12
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.05
		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		0.06	0.04		0.02
		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.07)
Years served in position				0.01*	
				(0.01)	
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				0.05	
				(0.07)	
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				-0.05	
				(0.08)	
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Is white (1=yes)		-0.03	-0.09	-0.12	-0.13
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Log of City Population			0.02	0.02	0.01
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Number of Seats on Council			-0.02^	-0.02*	-0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			0.09	0.09	0.10
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			0.07	0.08	0.08
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					0.01
					(0.08)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			0.08	0.08	0.06
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			0.13	0.13	0.11
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Constant	0.39**	0.52**	0.45	0.39	0.53
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.35)
Observations	308	295	249	249	214
R-squared	0.021	0.032	0.061	0.082	0.047

Note: This table shows the pooled results from Panel A of Figure 1 with control variables. The dependent variable is whether the official chose the first neighborhood (DV=1) over the second neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether the first neighborhood is swing as opposed to core. This is a slightly different presentation of the results from Figure 1, which shows the percent choosing the swing neighborhood over the core neighborhood instead of the effect of a neighborhood being swing on the probability that officials choose it, as is the case here. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A9: Core v. Swing: Non-Pooled Results from Panel A of Figure 1 with Control Variables (Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Both Neighborhoods are High Turnout (1=yes)	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		0.06	0.00	0.01	0.09
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.05	-0.02	0.00	-0.03
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.01	0.05	0.06	0.00
		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		0.10	0.12^		
		(0.06)	(0.07)		
Years served in position				-0.01	-0.00
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				0.18*	0.17*
				(0.07)	(0.08)
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				0.14^	0.16^
				(0.08)	(0.09)
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05*
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Is white (1=yes)		0.07	0.09	0.12	0.11
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Log of City Population			-0.03	-0.04	-0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Number of Seats on Council			-0.00	-0.00	0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			0.12	0.11	0.15^
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			0.02	0.02	0.04
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					0.06
					(0.08)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			0.01	0.03	0.04
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			-0.04	-0.04	0.02
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Constant	0.54**	0.47**	0.78**	0.79**	0.73*
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.35)
Observations	308	295	249	249	214
R-squared	0.004	0.019	0.046	0.072	0.085

Note: This table shows the non-pooled results from Panel A of Figure 1 with control variables. The dependent variable is whether the official chose the swing neighborhood (DV=1) over the core neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether both neighborhoods were high turnout as opposed to both being low turnout. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A10: High Turnout vs. Low Turnout: Pooled Results from Panel B of Figure 1 with Control Variables (Hypothesis 4)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Neighborhood 1 is high turnout (1=yes)	0.64**	0.65**	0.67**	0.67**	0.66**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-0.16^
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.06	-0.11	-0.11	-0.13
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		0.07	0.08		0.09
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.06)
Years served in position				0.00	
				(0.01)	
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				-0.10	
				(0.09)	
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				0.07	
				(0.06)	
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Is white (1=yes)		-0.02	0.13	0.14	0.22*
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Log of City Population			-0.02	-0.02	-0.04
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Seats on Council			0.02*	0.02**	0.03**
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			0.08	0.09	-0.02
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			0.04	0.03	0.07
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					0.03
					(0.06)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			-0.02	-0.01	-0.03
			(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			0.04	0.05	0.03
			(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Constant	0.16**	0.23*	0.13	0.10	0.14
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.27)
Observations	312	302	251	251	212
R-squared	0.412	0.422	0.476	0.476	0.480

Note: This table shows the pooled results from Panel A of Figure 1 with control variables. The dependent variable is whether the officials chose the first neighborhood (DV=1) over the second neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether the first neighborhood is high turnout as opposed to low turnout. This is a slightly different presentation of the results from Figure 1, which shows the percent choosing the high turnout neighborhood over the low turnout neighborhood instead of the effect of a neighborhood being high turnout on the probability that officials choose it, as is the case here. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A11: High Turnout vs. Low Turnout: Non-Pooled Results from Panel B of Figure 1 with Control Variables (Hypotheses 3 and 4)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Both Neighborhoods are Swing (1=yes)	0.07^	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.00
		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.05	-0.06	-0.07	-0.02
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.11
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		0.06	0.06		
		(0.05)	(0.05)		
Years served in position				0.00	0.00
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				-0.04	-0.05
				(0.05)	(0.06)
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				0.10	0.07
				(0.06)	(0.07)
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Is white (1=yes)		0.18*	0.21*	0.22**	0.30**
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Log of City Population			0.01	0.01	0.02
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Seats on Council			0.00	0.00	0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			-0.05	-0.05	-0.08
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			-0.00	-0.01	0.00
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					-0.02
					(0.06)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			0.15**	0.16**	0.16**
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			0.02	0.03	0.17
			(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Constant	0.78**	0.58**	0.37^	0.33	0.18
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.27)
Observations	312	302	251	251	212
R-squared	0.009	0.044	0.085	0.091	0.109

Note: This table shows the non-pooled results from Panel B of Figure 1 with control variables. The dependent variable is whether the official chose the high turnout neighborhood (DV=1) over the low turnout neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether both neighborhoods were swing as opposed to both being core. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A12: Do officials target High Turnout Swing and Low Turnout Core (Hypothesis 3)? (Regression of Results from Figure 1 with Control Variables)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Neighborhood 1 is High Turnout Swing or Low Turnout Core (1=yes)	0.12**	0.13**	0.13**	0.13**	0.11*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.03
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.11
		(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		0.05	0.05		0.04
		(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.05)
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				-0.00	
				(0.06)	
Years served in position				0.01	
				(0.00)	
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				0.08	
				(0.05)	
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Is white (1=yes)		-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.01
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Log of City Population			-0.00	-0.00	-0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Seats on Council			0.00	0.00	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			0.09	0.08	0.05
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			0.04	0.04	0.06
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					-0.04
					(0.06)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			0.02	0.01	0.02
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			0.04	0.04	0.00
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Constant	0.42**	0.51**	0.45*	0.43*	0.74**
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Observations	620	597	500	500	426
R-squared	0.015	0.023	0.031	0.038	0.032

Note: This table pools all of the results from Figure 1 to see if officials cross panels A and B are more likely to 1) target the High Turnout Swing neighborhood over either the High Turnout Core (Panel A) or Low Turnout Swing (Panel B) or 2) target the Low Turnout Core neighborhood over the either the Low Turnout Swing (Panel A) or High Turnout Core (Panel B). The dependent variable is whether the officials chose the first neighborhood (DV=1) over the second neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether the first neighborhood is either High Turnout Swing or Low Turnout Core as opposed to the other conditions. This is a slightly different presentation of the results from Figure 1, which shows the percent choosing the neighborhood that has a particular level of support or turnout instead of the effect of a neighborhood being a particular type on the probability that officials choose it, as is the case here. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

C.2: Regression Results for Figure 6

Table A13: Core v. Swing: Pooled Results from Panel A of Figure 6 with Control Variables (Hypotheses 1 and 2)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Neighborhood 1 is swing (1=yes)	0.27**	0.27*	0.23^	0.24^	0.14
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		-0.12	-0.17	-0.16	-0.30
		(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.21)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.09	-0.18	-0.17	-0.11
		(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.05	-0.02	0.01	0.13
		(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.27)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		-0.08	-0.08		-0.12
		(0.10)	(0.12)		(0.15)
Years served in position				-0.00	
				(0.01)	
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				-0.06	
				(0.14)	
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				-0.03	
				(0.14)	
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Is white (1=yes)		0.07	0.05	0.06	0.06
		(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.27)
Log of City Population			-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Number of Seats on Council			0.03	0.03	-0.01
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			-0.02	-0.01	0.01
			(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			0.11	0.12	-0.01
			(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			0.06	0.06	0.14
			(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			0.42	0.40	0.10
			(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.37)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					0.02
					(0.15)
Constant	0.40**	0.48^	0.46	0.46	0.84
	(0.07)	(0.25)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.76)
Observations	98	97	81	81	67
R-squared	0.073	0.091	0.138	0.137	0.114

Note: This table shows the pooled results from Panel A of Figure 6 with control variables. The dependent variable is whether the official chose the first neighborhood (DV=1) over the second neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether the first neighborhood is swing as opposed to core. This is a slightly different presentation of the results from Figure 6, which shows the percent choosing the swing neighborhood over the core neighborhood instead of the effect of a neighborhood being swing on the probability that officials choose it, as is the case here. Standard errors in parentheses. ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, ^ $p<0.1$

Table A14: Core v. Swing: Non-Pooled Results from Panel A of Figure 6 with Control Variables (Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Both Neighborhoods are High Turnout (1=yes)	0.17^	0.17^	0.19^	0.18	0.27*
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		-0.17	-0.19	-0.15	-0.10
		(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.12	-0.13	-0.15	-0.18
		(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.13	-0.12	-0.08	-0.30
		(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		-0.09	-0.16		
		(0.09)	(0.11)		
Years served in position				-0.02^	-0.02^
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				-0.15	-0.05
				(0.12)	(0.14)
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				0.02	0.01
				(0.13)	(0.14)
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		-0.07*	-0.10*	-0.11**	-0.11*
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Is white (1=yes)		0.51**	0.46*	0.47*	0.38
		(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.24)
Log of City Population			0.04	0.03	0.05
			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Number of Seats on Council			0.00	0.00	0.04
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			0.06	0.12	0.11
			(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			-0.06	-0.11	-0.04
			(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			0.13	0.13	0.06
			(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			-0.09	-0.16	0.12
			(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.32)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					-0.03
					(0.14)
Constant	0.55**	0.47*	0.26	0.46	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.66)
Observations	98	97	81	81	67
R-squared	0.033	0.194	0.234	0.274	0.330

Note: This table shows the non-pooled results from Panel A of Figure 6 with control variables. The dependent variable is whether the official chose the swing neighborhood (DV=1) over the core neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether both neighborhoods were high turnout as opposed to both being average turnout. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A15: High Turnout vs. Low Turnout: Pooled Results from Panel B of Figure 1 with Control Variables (Hypothesis 4)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Neighborhood 1 is high turnout (1=yes)	0.21*	0.19^	0.22^	0.21	0.22^
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		0.15	0.15	0.20	0.19
		(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		0.04	0.01	0.02	0.03
		(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.11	-0.01	-0.05	0.01
		(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		-0.01	-0.02		0.02
		(0.10)	(0.12)		(0.13)
Years served in position				-0.00	
				(0.01)	
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				0.23^	
				(0.13)	
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				-0.13	
				(0.14)	
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		-0.00	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Is white (1=yes)		0.05	0.08	0.04	0.21
		(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Log of City Population			-0.02	-0.04	0.03
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Number of Seats on Council			-0.03	-0.01	-0.03
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			-0.01	0.02	-0.10
			(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			0.11	0.12	0.19
			(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			-0.12	-0.20	-0.09
			(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			-0.22	-0.19	-0.22
			(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					0.18
					(0.15)
Constant	0.31**	0.27	0.75	0.93	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.80)
Observations	103	101	88	88	81
R-squared	0.041	0.065	0.104	0.156	0.169

Note: This table shows the pooled results from Panel B of Figure 6 with control variables. The dependent variable is whether the officials chose the first neighborhood (DV=1) over the second neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether the first neighborhood is high turnout as opposed to average turnout. This is a slightly different presentation of the results from Figure 6, which shows the percent choosing the high turnout neighborhood over the average turnout neighborhood instead of the effect of a neighborhood being high turnout on the probability that officials choose it, as is the case here. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A16: High Turnout vs. Low Turnout: Non-Pooled Results from Panel B of Figure 6 with Control Variables (Hypotheses 3 and 4)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Both Neighborhoods are Swing (1=yes)	0.37**	0.39**	0.39**	0.38**	0.35**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		0.20^	0.07	0.13	0.12
		(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.13	-0.14	-0.15	-0.13
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.14	-0.18	-0.18	-0.18
		(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		0.14	0.25*		
		(0.09)	(0.11)		
Years served in position				0.03*	0.02^
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				0.25*	0.23^
				(0.11)	(0.12)
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				0.15	0.17
				(0.12)	(0.14)
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Is white (1=yes)		0.30	0.34^	0.26	0.27
		(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)
Log of City Population			0.04	0.04	0.01
			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Number of Seats on Council			-0.05^	-0.04	-0.06
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			-0.13	-0.11	-0.14
			(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			-0.01	0.01	0.03
			(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					-0.11
					(0.13)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			-0.07	-0.09	-0.15
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			-0.05	-0.02	-0.04
			(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Constant	0.39**	0.21	0.13	0.06	0.53
	(0.07)	(0.22)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.74)
Observations	103	101	88	88	81
R-squared	0.142	0.228	0.314	0.355	0.332

Note: This table shows the non-pooled results from Panel B of Figure 6 with control variables. The dependent variable is whether the official chose the high turnout neighborhood (DV=1) over the average turnout neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether both neighborhoods were swing as opposed to both being core. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A17: Do officials target High Turnout Swing and Low Turnout Core (Hypothesis 3)? (Regression of Results from Figure 6 with Control Variables)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat: Neighborhood 1 is High Turnout Swing or Low Turnout Core (1=yes)	0.28**	0.30**	0.32**	0.31**	0.34**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		0.07	0.04	0.04	0.01
		(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.00	-0.06	-0.05	0.00
		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.12	-0.00	-0.02	0.07
		(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		-0.05	-0.01		-0.04
		(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.09)
Years served in position				-0.00	
				(0.01)	
Plans to serve additional 6+ years (1=yes)				0.06	
				(0.09)	
75% chance runs for higher in 5 yrs (1=yes)				-0.09	
				(0.09)	
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Is white (1=yes)		0.14	0.13	0.12	0.20
		(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Log of City Population			-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Number of Seats on Council			-0.01	-0.00	-0.02
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			0.09	0.09	0.01
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			0.02	0.02	-0.02
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			-0.10	-0.11	-0.05
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			-0.11	-0.11	-0.29
			(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.18)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)					0.11
					(0.10)
Constant	0.33**	0.28	0.74*	0.75*	0.52
	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.46)
Observations	201	198	169	169	148
R-squared	0.076	0.096	0.115	0.123	0.144

Note: This table pools all of the results from Figure 6 to see if officials cross panels A and B are more likely to 1) target the High Turnout Swing neighborhood over either the High Turnout Core (Panel A) or Average Turnout Swing (Panel B) or 2) target the Average Turnout Core neighborhood over the either the Average Turnout Swing (Panel A) or High Turnout Core (Panel B). The dependent variable is whether the officials chose the first neighborhood (DV=1) over the second neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether the first neighborhood is either High Turnout Swing or Average Turnout Core as opposed to the other conditions. This is a slightly different presentation of the results from Figure 1, which shows the percent choosing the neighborhood that has a particular level of support or turnout instead of the effect of a neighborhood being a particular type on the probability that officials choose it, as is the case here. Standard errors in parentheses. ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, ^ $p<0.1$

D: Addressing Potential Concerns with Research Design & Vignette

In this section, I address several potential concerns with my research design and survey experiment vignette. Many of the additional analyses to address these concerns involve analyzing heterogeneous treatment effects. Though I think these are helpful in addressing some concerns with the paper, I also want to be clear about the limits of such analyses. Identifying causal relationships with heterogeneous treatment effects is difficult and some of the differences that I identify may be spurious since I am examining multiple outcomes across multiple variables. In addition, I lack significant statistical power in these analyses given the number of treatments and observations.

Another way I address potential concerns is by examining survey respondents' comments about the survey. At the end of the survey, I asked respondents to provide feedback. Overall, 33% of respondents to the survey experiment provided some written feedback. I have coded their responses to identify their concerns and critiques about the survey. Tables A3 and A4 in the supplementary appendix provide the full results of that coding process. In summary, 6% of the respondents said at least one thing positive about the survey (almost always in very general terms) while 21% mentioned at least one negative item or criticism about the survey. 2% provided a negative comment about this vignette in particular while another 2% mentioned something negative about any vignette in general or specifically other vignettes (there were two other vignettes for other projects in this wave of the survey). Overall, the feedback suggests that respondents did not take issue with some of the potential problems highlighted below.

D.1: Use of Road Repair as Distributive Good in Vignette

One potential concern with the paper is my use of a road repair project as the distributive good since many local governments use programmatic formulas and assessments to determine which projects to complete. Thus, in practice, many officials may have less influence or discretion in choosing which projects are ultimately implemented. This is an important point, and I agree that the process outlined in the vignette may not line up with all cities' process for determining road repair projects. At the same time, it is difficult to identify a distributive good and its related decision-making process that would fit well across all types of municipalities. Indeed, the diversity of characteristics and institutions across municipalities is a key challenge in any systematic study of local governments (Warshaw 2019). As such, I faced several tradeoffs in determining what issue to use in the vignette.

Ultimately, I decided that a locally used road repair project struck the best balance across these tradeoffs for a few reasons. First, since the study is about particularistic distributive goods, my highest priority was to at least identify an issue that met the definition of being something that would clearly be desired by citizens and benefit only the citizens in a particular neighborhood. As explained in the paper, a locally used road repair project meets this criteria, and it does so for both large cities and small towns. Even cities below a population of 5,000 have roads that are only used by those living in that particular neighborhood. On the other hand, other resources that I considered like a park or library may be used by many residents far beyond the immediate neighborhood in which they're located, making them less of a particularistic distributive good than the road repair project described in the vignette. This is especially the case in cities below a population of 100,000 and even more so for those below 20,000, which may only have one or two library branches within their municipal boundaries if any at all. Many small towns, as well, may only have a few parks, and thus a city councilor representing a district in a small town may not even have a park within their boundaries or may have such small districts that all neighborhoods within their district (or city) would benefit from having one.

Second, I wanted the issue to be one that many officials have dealt with on some level, even if their city's decision-making process on the particular issue was slightly different than the one

described in the vignette. Since the decision-making process can vary significantly across municipalities and issue areas, it is difficult to structure a vignette that would perfectly match each municipality. Thus, I thought it was important to at least choose an issue that is very common across nearly all municipalities, and road repair is the most common service across municipalities that I have identified. According to Oliver, Ha, and Callen (2012), "street repairs" are the most common service provided by municipalities. I examined the US Census Bureau (2008) data on city finances from 2006 and also found that highway and road construction and maintenance is the most common of the services measured in the survey with 74% of municipalities providing this directly. The second highest was parks at 59%, followed by sewerage and water utilities, both at 55%. About half provided either fire protection and law enforcement, and only 24% directly provided libraries. In the open-ended feedback requested at the end of the survey (Table 4), no one mentioned that road repairs was something that their city did not deal with even though several respondents mentioned that some of the other questions on the survey (for other projects by other authors) asked about issue areas that were not relevant to their city, such as setting the rate of a local gas tax. Moreover, in the few cases (0.7% of respondents) when officials critiqued the survey for focusing too much on issues that were more relevant to larger cities or higher levels of government,[6] they would often mention how they focused on more day to day things, like roads.

I also address this concern to some degree in how I structured the specific scenario in the vignette. In it, I pointed out that both projects have equal merit, leaving the possibility that there is some sort of formula for determining project priorities, and that it's a matter of not having enough in the budget to cover both. I also mentioned that the city councilor is thinking about which project to support, which is broad language that could be applied to many different budget decision-making processes. I do, however, specifically mention that "in this municipality, the city council sets the transportation budget," which is a different process than the programmatic budgeting process. At the same time, an advantage of vignette-style survey experiments and lab experiments is that I can have respondents draw on their experiences and attitudes in response to somewhat abstract scenarios. Though I agree that describing a scenario that is too far removed from their experience could be problematic, I believe that the process described in the vignette is still plausible and familiar even if it does not perfectly match some of the respondents' institutional arrangements.

To examine the extent to which potential differences between the vignette and the budgeting process was problematic for respondents, I examined responses to the open-ended feedback I requested at the end of the survey (Table A4). 2% provided a negative comment about this vignette in particular while another 2% mentioned something negative about any vignette in general or specifically other vignettes (there were two other vignettes for other projects in this wave of the survey). Only 0.5% of respondents specifically mentioned that the vignette did not line up with their budgeting process, and none said that providing road repairs was outside of the services provided by their municipality. Another 0.1% stated that the vignettes in general were not applicable to their experience, a sentiment that could have also been driven by differences in the budgeting process. 0.4% also said this about the survey in general. Given that many respondents were willing to provide negative feedback, I believe that the very low percentage of respondents mentioning the differences between the vignette and their municipalities actual budgeting process for road repairs strongly suggests that it was not a major factor for respondents.

The use of capital-facilities programs may be more likely in some cities than others, such as places with city-managers. To the best I could identify in the research literature, it also appears

[6] The end of the survey consisted of a series of issue position questions that were used for ideal point estimates to compare local officials' ideology to those at higher levels of government. These questions specifically were the source of more complaints than any other particular question. 7.1% of respondents mentioned these issue position question in a negative light.

that the use of planning tools like this, such as performance-based budgeting, is also more likely in larger cities (Ho 2011). To examine whether the use of more programmatic budgeting processes might affect my results, I test whether my results differ based on city population and form of government (i.e., whether the city has a council-manager form of government). Overall, when I break down the main results from Figure 1 by whether officials are in cities with city managers (Figures A4, A5, and A6) or whether they are in the top quarter in terms of population (above 39,000) (Figures A7 and A8), the results do not change significantly from the main results other than that officials from cities with a mayor-council form of government are more likely to choose high turnout voters over low turnout ones relative to officials from council-manager cities. It is not clear to me that this difference necessarily means that the budgeting process affected responses since officials in cities with mayors often face more competitive elections (Oliver, Ha, and Callen (2012, chapter 4) and may thus feel more pressure to target high turnout voters. Nonetheless, there is this difference in the results.

D.2: Officials from At-Large Seats

Another potential concern is that many city councilors are at-large and this could be an issue for at least two reasons. The first is that the vignette uses the term "district" to describe the location of the two neighborhoods that need a road repair project. This may have been confusing to mayors or city councilors who represent the entire municipality. The second is that the dynamics of distributive politics may differ for city councils with at-large representatives. Most municipal officials are elected at-large. 61% of respondents are in cities where the entire city council is at-large. 20% are from cities that have a mix of at-large and districts. 19% are in cities that only have districts. Though I didn't ask officials whether they themselves were elected at-large, a large proportion of respondents were asked this question in a subsequent survey while others' status has been identified through additional research conducted by my research assistants. Overall, 72% of respondents (including elected chief executives, i.e., mayors) represent at-large seats.

Concerning the first concern about at-large officials, I wish I had structured the survey differently so that the text of the vignette differed depending on whether the official was at-large or not. At the same time, I also suspect that the at-large officials reading the vignette would realize what was the key problem at heart in the vignette – which neighborhood to support among the city councilor's voters, whether they themselves represent a district or the entire city – and would naturally rely on their experience and attitudes in providing a response even if they were at-large representative themselves.

To further examine whether this was an issue for respondents, I examined their open-ended feedback (Table A4) and found that only one person mentioned that the vignette did not apply well to them since their city council consists entirely of at-large seats. However, their concern was not that this made answering the question difficult but, rather, that at-large city councils are less concerned with political motivations. It's possible that some of the more general critiques of the survey were also motivated by this concern, but nearly all of the negative feedback was about a particular aspect of the survey. For example, only 0.5% mentioned that they didn't like the survey in general and another 0.8% said they disliked the vignettes without mentioning a specific critique. 0.1% mentioned that they felt that the vignettes were not applicable to their experience without mentioning in what specific way. Since respondents were quite willing to provide critiques of our survey, the lack of feedback on this potential concern suggests is was not problematic for respondents.

The second point about at-large city councils touches on a theoretical question that the literature has not directly addressed: are the incentives for targeting core vs. swing supporters different for officials on a city council with at-large representatives? Most relevant to this question is a related literature on whether at-large city councilors are more concerned about city-

wide benefits and less prone to engage in parochial, distributive politics and logrolling. The argument that at-large officials are more focused on city-wide benefits and are less parochial (Banfield and Wilson 1963) continues to be used as a reason for adopting an at-large form of government (e.g., ICMA 2003, 15). However, there are serious limitations in the theoretical argument behind the expectation that at-large city councils should lead to less spending and less pork (e.g., Langbein, Crewson, and Brasher 1996), and empirical work on this question provides mixed results at best. (For a review, see Burnett and Kogan (2014, 652).) To the extent that recent scholarship expects having at-large city councilors will change local government spending and policy outcomes, it is because the location of their median voter and the preferences of their reelection constituency are different than they would be if these officials represented districts (e.g., Langbein, Crewson, and Brasher 1996; Bradbury and Stephenson 2003; Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez De La Cruz 2009; Trounstine 2010), allowing officials to put locally undesirable goods (e.g., landfills, water treatment plants) in politically weak neighborhoods. It's not that these scholars expect these at-large councilors to be any less interested in trying to influence policy in electorally advantageous ways. From this perspective, at-large city councilors would still face similar incentives when deciding whether to target swing, core, and/or high turnout voters with benefits.

I had a harder time identifying work specifically on whether at-large city councils lead to more collaboration and less bargaining among city council members. Burnett and Kogan (2014) look at this in terms of logrolling among city councilors and do not find much evidence of this occurring at least in the district-elected city councilors in Los Angeles, suggesting that logrolling behavior between district and at-large city councils may not differ much. This has also been examined indirectly by work on overall spending since logrolling is hypothesized to lead to more spending (Banfield and Wilson 1963). As mentioned, most work does not find evidence that at-large city councils spend less (Bradbury and Stephenson 2003; Hajnal and Trounstine 2010; Burnett and Kogan 2014). One possible explanation for this is that at-large city councilors may not be as ideologically homogeneous as often assumed even though they represent the same electorate (Langbein, Crewson, and Brasher 1996, 279).

There is evidence that at-large representatives have less communication with constituents due to representing more people than officials from similar-sized cities with districts (Clingermayer and Feiock 2014). This could potentially affect their willingness to target core vs. swing voters under H2.2.

To examine all of this in more detail, I examine whether at-large officials' responses differ from other respondents (Figures A9-A14). Across the various ways I measure whether an individual is elected as at-large (e.g., sometimes I include mayors from mayor-council cities and sometimes I do not) or whether they are from a city with an at-large council, I fail to find any significant differences in their responses. This suggests that having at-large city councilors does not impact the targeting strategies examined in this paper.

D.3: Responding as Campaign Managers

Another potential concern is my choice to have officials give advice to a city councilor in the role of a campaign adviser rather than just asking them how they would behave in this situation. I spent considerable time deciding the best way to present the vignette and measure the main outcome measure. Ideally, I want to learn how officials would respond in real life to situations like the one in the vignette. In trying to achieve this ideal with the vignette, I faced several trade-offs and ultimately decided to use the version presented in the paper even though I seriously considered structuring the vignette so that I just asked officials how they would respond in this situation.

My decision to ask officials to give the city councilor campaign advice stems from my desire to make sure the vignette and treatments matched the theories being tested, and the key claim in

these theories is that officials should target one type of voter over another *when all else is equal*. Though I considered adding other information that varied across the neighborhoods, I worried that introducing other details could result in two neighborhoods that did not seem equally deserving of the road repair projects to respondents. This would cause the experiment to deviate from the theories I were attempting to test. An additional concern I had with adding other information about the neighborhoods is that respondents might purposely ignore the electorally relevant information in their responses in order to present themselves as being above electoral politics, something that my additional work with municipal officials confirms is an important concern. Since this survey of municipal officials, I have participated in other surveys and conducted interviews with a dozen officials on the phone. One thing that comes through is that officials are more likely to see themselves as motivated by the public interest or as trustees who are above electoral politics, especially when asked directly. Yet, in my conversations and in responses to other survey experiments, I find that they are actually quite willing to engage in strategic electoral behavior to avoid blame and claim credit.

Given the considerations above, I decided it was best to structure the experiment so that respondents were deciding between two neighborhoods based solely on electoral information directly relevant to the theories motivating the project. But this approach also had some potential downsides. The first is that I worried that officials might balk at the idea of being asked how they themselves would behave in a scenario where the only information provided was clearly about electoral considerations (for reasons discussed in the previous paragraph). I decided, then, that I needed to structure the vignette in a way where it would naturally make sense to the subjects to only be presented with electoral-related characteristics about the two neighborhoods. Asking them to provide campaign advice was my solution to this. Since the vignette is about a campaign adviser making suggestions to a city councilor, it would make more sense to officials that the only information I provided them was the electoral factors that are at the heart of the theories of interest in my study.

Another concern I had with asking officials which neighborhood they themselves would choose in this situation is that it might amplify problems stemming from the concern above about discrepancies between the budgeting process in the vignette and the actual process used by their municipality – i.e., I feared they would be much more likely to believe that they could not answer how they would behave since their city does things somewhat differently. Having them play the role of advising another city councilor in another city reduces this concern. I also worried that officials would want to have more info about the two neighborhoods if I asked them how they themselves would behave in this situation, which could lead to the situation not being all else equal as required by the theories being tested. (However, I did say specifically in the vignette that both neighborhoods were equally deserving of the project, which is why there was this ambiguity about which neighborhood should get the funding.)

A review of the open-ended feedback (Table A4) suggests that this approach succeeded for many respondents or at least was not off putting enough to lead them to comment on it. Only 0.1% specifically mentioned that they found it odd to be asked to play the role of a campaign manager in the vignette. The bigger concern about this vignette was its obvious focus on electoral considerations, with 1% of respondents mentioning this and another 1% mentioning this as a problem in general about the survey. 0.6% mentioned that they needed more info to make their choice in this vignette. Another 3% mentioned this about the survey in general, a critique that could have also been motivated by this specific vignette even though they didn't mention it as the source. Combined, only 4.5% of respondents made at least one of these critiques or indicated a general dislike for the vignettes or survey overall. (I'm including general dislike in this number since the structure of this vignette could have been a cause for that.)

D.4: Local Officials' Electoral Ambitions

A related concern to asking officials to play the role of a campaign manager is the view that many of the respondents are political amateurs relative to state legislators and members of Congress in particular. This concern isn't just about the issue of asking officials to provide campaign advice but also about the assumption that municipal officials would even consider these electoral factors in their decision-making over policies. Even if I had asked them how they themselves would behave in this situation, their responses may not have reflected their actual behavior since they were asked to choose between two neighborhoods based on electoral factors when it is possible that some of them would have sincerely made the choice based on other considerations (even when facing a similar situation in real life). This can be a difficult issue to overcome especially since (as mentioned above) many officials (including even members of Congress) downplay the extent that they consider electoral calculations in their decision-making when asked directly about it.

I can address this challenge through several means, which overall suggest to me that many of these officials have incentives to consider electoral factors in their decision-making. Moreover, I can identify the more ambitious officials in my sample based on their seniority, expressed political plans (Maestas 2002), and the size of their municipality (Oliver, Ha, Callen 2012). When I do this, I find that ambitious officials have different targeting strategies when choosing between high and low turnout neighborhoods.

The open-ended feedback (Table A4) suggests that the electoral focus of the vignette was not a problem for the vast majority of respondents. Only 1% of respondents were critical of the survey's focus on electoral calculations in the vignette and another 1% mentioned this as a problem in general about the survey. Negative comments about the forced choice nature of the questions/responses could also relate to this concern as a couple of respondents (0.2%) mentioned this specifically about the vignette and not being able to choose neither of the neighborhoods. Many more mentioned the forced choice as a problem in general about the survey (11%), but about half of these officials (5%) stated this was problematic specifically in the battery of issue position questions at the end of the survey where respondents could only indicate whether they supported a particular issue position or not. Finally, comments about wanting more information in the vignettes (1%) or in general (3%) might also reflect officials who would rather consider other factors than electoral ones in their decision-making. Overall, 7% of respondents critiqued the survey on these grounds or critiqued the survey or vignettes in general. (I're not including the 5% who criticized the forced choice questions specifically in the issue position questions.) This is still a pretty small portion of respondents and the results do not change when I exclude these officials from the analysis.

Another way to address this problem is by looking at past work on local officials' ambition and the extent to which it should lead them to consider electoral factors in their decision-making. Unlike the Congressional literature, there is less work directly on this at the local level. A lot of empirical work on the behavior of local officials either assumes (at least implicitly) that local officials are behaving somewhat like the classic reelection minded politician. Other work, on the other hand, assumes that they're motivated by civic duty and do not fully address the extent to which electoral considerations come into play. Our reading of the literature places the average local official somewhere in between, with some behaving like the classic politician and others acting more as volunteers with few electoral motivations.

Oliver, Ha, and Callen (2012) provide an extensive examination of who runs for office in middle-sized to small cities – i.e., the type of officials who make up the respondents. Though "civic duty" is the most common response when asked why they ran, it's just 24% of respondents (2012, 102) and may be a cover for other goals and motivations. What is clear, however, is that these local officials are the political elite of their community and are often high achievers in terms of their professional and educational background (e.g., law, management). Sokolow (1989) and

Lascher (1993) focus specifically on the ambitions of small-town officials. Though they find less progressive ambition among these officials and low extrinsic benefits from holding these offices, these scholars still find that small town officials receive deep intrinsic benefits from being in office (Lascher 1993) and have ambitions to make an impact in their community (Sokolow 1989). They are not just volunteers. This desire to achieve particular goals and thus stay in office should provide many local officials with some incentive to engage in strategic political behavior to stay in office (though not to the same degree as members of Congress).

I can also examine how much officials might consider electoral factors in their decision making by looking at their political ambitions based on survey measures and their propensity to run for reelection. This latter item is a key empirical figure used to justify the argument that members of Congress respond to electoral factors (Mayhew 1974). Since the 1960's, about 90 to 95% of members of Congress run for reelection. In the last decade or so, about 70% of state legislators have done so (Rogers 2020). With municipal officials, it is lower still at 43% based on Trounstine (2013) and 45% based on the 2006 ICMA municipal survey (2006). Though this is half the number of members of Congress, it is still a significant proportion of these officials. It is also likely that a small percentage (likely less than 10 or even 5%) are not running for reelection because they are running for higher office and the mayoral office in particular.

I can also measure local officials' political ambitions using their survey responses about their political plans (Maestas 2002). On these metrics, they look similar to state legislators. Maestas (2002), for example, classifies ambitious state legislators as those who plan to run for higher office (19% of her sample) or at least stay 3 or more terms (6+ years) in their current office if they didn't want to run for higher office (13% of her sample). I asked similar questions of the local officials. Similarly, I find that 19% indicated that there was a 75% chance or higher that they would run for higher office within the next five years. Another 22% indicated that they plan to stay in their current office for 6 or more years.

To take this a step further, I also identify the more ambitious officials in the sample and examine whether they systematically respond differently than their less ambitious colleagues. I use both the Maestas (2002) measure of ambition and the size of respondents' city, since Oliver, Ha, and Callen (2012) argue that officials from larger cities (pop. around 100,000 of bigger) are more ambitious. I also take account of how long officials have served, since some officials may not plan to serve much longer because they've already been in office for some time, which also indicates a higher level of ambition. Across several measure of ambition using these different metrics (Figures A15-A20), I consistently find that more ambitious officials are similar to less ambitious officials in terms of targeting swing vs. core voters. They also target high turnout voters at the same rate when the neighborhood support is pooled. However, more ambitious local officials are less likely to target high turnout neighborhoods when they're core than when they're swing while less ambitious officials target high turnout neighborhoods at the same rate regardless of whether both the high and low turnout neighborhoods are core or swing supporters. I now highlight this in the robustness checks section of the paper.

To sum, there is good reason to worry that local officials may not consider electoral factors in their decisions, but I find that the results look quite similar even when I limit the results to the more ambitious officials in the sample who very likely consider electoral factors like officials at higher levels of government.

D.5: Measuring Risk Aversion

Another potential concern might be about my measure of risk aversion since it's just based on one question compared to Kam and Simas (2010) who measure risk aversion using a scale based on responses to 7 questions. I also had concerns about a one-question measure but were reassured by the work to validate this measure (Dohmen et al. 2011) and one that is very similar (Ehrlich and Maestas 2010; Maestas and Pollock 2010). In fact, the article presenting and initially

validating the measure I use (Dohmen et al. 2011) has been cited 2,450 times according to Google Scholar, and the number of citations has increased each year since its publication.

In comparing my measure to Kam and Simas (2010), my measure of risk aversion is very similar to the first item used in their scale. In addition, the validation methods (Dohmen et al. 2011; Ehrlich and Maestas 2010; Kam and Simas 2010; Maestas and Pollock 2010) are similar in that each shows that their measure of risk aversion correlates with individual characteristics that predict or correlate with risk-taking. Ehrlich and Maestas (2010) and Maestas and Pollock (2010) go a step further and show that their one-question measure also correlates strongly with behaviors that are known to correlate with risk-taking. Dohmen et al. (2011) take this even further and show that their measure (which is the one I use in the paper) also predicts risk-taking behavioral outcomes in an experiment. Given these considerations, I have confidence in the measure I used and feel that the additional benefits of having a shorter measure in a survey (Ehrlich and Maestas 2010; Maestas and Pollock 2010; Lönnqvist et al. 2015) of elites were substantiated

D.6: Extreme Turnout Treatment Conditions

One final concern is that the values used in the treatment conditions are potentially too extreme, especially in the case of the turnout treatments. This could make me unlikely to find that officials would devote resources to a neighborhood with core supporters who have a much lower propensity to vote.

A related concern is that 10% turnout is unrealistically low. Based on turnout data, I believe 10% turnout in a neighborhood could be quite common for many local elections and wouldn't necessarily indicate a place that is an electoral basket case. As Oliver, Ha, and Callen (2012) find, turnout in municipal elections is usually below 35% of registered voters. Though turnout is quite high in cities that hold their elections at the same time as Congressional midterms (mean=55.6) and Presidential elections (mean=76.4), about 80% of municipalities hold their elections at other times. For cities with elections in odd years that are more likely to line up with state elections, average turnout is around 35%. And for those that hold elections that do not line up with either state or national elections, average turnout is just 18%. The median is 15% with a standard deviation of 12. Thus, 10% turnout is well within a standard deviation of the mean in many cities. However, for officials in cities with elections that are concurrent with national ones (about 20% of cities based on Hajnal and Lewis (2003) and data I've gathered on election timing of officials in my sample), 10% could be drastically low. Overall, though, the high turnout treatment is probably more out of line with most cities' experience than the low turnout treatment; though again, it's quite possible that there are high participating neighborhoods even within a city that has generally low turnout.

Regardless, these are large differences that could draw officials too much to the high turnout neighborhood. I want to push back against this just a bit by pointing out that the turnout treatments do state that even in the low turnout condition, a large percentage of potential residents *could* be mobilized to vote. The exact language is that "10% will definitely vote. 65% could potentially vote if mobilized by a campaign." I felt that this captured a key idea in the turnout-core models – that it's about using distributive spending to help encourage turnout – and I structured the treatments in a way that made that clear.

I take a couple of approaches to address whether respondents viewed the low turnout treatment as being unbelievably low or too low to ever target. First, looking at the feedback from officials (Table A4), none mentioned that the turnout seemed too low in the vignette. Another way to examine this is to look at how officials responded to this treatment in the second survey experiment after the vignette (see Figure 5). When asked to indicate the probability that targeting the low turnout neighborhood would have a positive electoral impact, the average response was still around 50% (see statement 5 in Figure 5). Though the mean jumps up to 67% when the recipient is the high turnout neighborhood, officials still believe that targeting the low turnout

neighborhood has a decent chance of being electorally beneficial for the city councilor. If the low turnout condition were unbelievably low to respondents, their responses to this question should have also been much lower than a 50/50 chance. Also, the fact that ambitious officials were more likely to target the low turnout neighborhood when both were core (Figures A15-A20) suggests that the turnout wasn't too low for those respondents whose ambitions may line up better with the theories assumptions about politicians reelection motivations.

I also analyze whether responses differ significantly between officials who are from cities with elections that are concurrent with national elections (in which case, 10% may be unrealistically low) to those from cities that are nonconcurrent (in which case, 65% may be unrealistically high). In Figures A21-A22, I find that officials with concurrent elections behave like ambitious officials[7] – they're less likely to target the high turnout neighborhood when both are core than when both are swing. Meanwhile, officials with noncurrent elections target higher turnout neighborhoods at the same rate regardless of whether both are swing or core. This suggests that the low turnout condition was not too low for officials to pick it over the high turnout neighborhood since officials from cities with much higher turnout were more likely to choose the low turnout neighborhood under certain conditions. What is unclear, however, is why this targeting strategy differs across these officials. Given the very low number of officials with concurrent elections, it is also possible that the results here are spurious.

I have one last important way to examine whether my treatments varied turnout too much and whether, at some threshold, officials on average will be more likely to choose a lower turnout neighborhood when both are core than when both are swing. This is the second study presented in the "Robustness Checks" section of the paper. In this second study, the treatments described turnout as being about average in the lower turnout condition, which is much closer to the high turnout neighborhood than the 65% to 10% difference in the numerical version of the treatment conditions. This fortuitously gives me a test of whether the turnout differences were set too high, and the results suggest that they were. While the results examining whether officials will choose swing over core voters look very similar to the results in the first study, the results are different when examining whether officials will choose high turnout or low turnout neighborhoods. Officials still favor the high turnout neighborhoods when both neighborhoods are swing, but now, when both neighborhoods are core, they choose the high turnout neighborhood at a much lower rate (40%). The confidence intervals are pretty big here, so it's not clear if a majority are now favoring the low turnout neighborhood over the high turnout one, but the targeting strategy is definitely quite different.

[7] These two variables (ambition and election timing) are not correlated.

E: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

In this section, I examine the heterogeneous treatment effects mentioned in the paper and in the previous section. I begin with replications of Figure 1 for different subgroups and then show the regression results where the interaction of the subgroup and treatment is statistically significant.

Though I think these are helpful in addressing some concerns with the paper, I also want to be clear about the limits of such analyses. Identifying causal relationships with heterogeneous treatment effects is difficult and some of the differences that I identify may be spurious since I am examining multiple outcomes across multiple variables. In addition, my statistical power in these analyses is limited given the number of treatments and observations.

I look at heterogeneous treatment effects across the following variables to address concerns with the research design as discussed in the previous section:

- Form of Government (Figures A4-A6)
- Population (Figures A7-A8)
- At-Large vs. District elections (Figures A9-A14)
- Officials' Political Ambitions (Figures A15-A20)
- Election Timing (Figures A21-A22)

Across these analyses, I only find evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects with 3 subgroups:

- Officials from cities with the Mayor-Council form of government are even more likely to target high turnout voters. (Pooled results in Panel B of Figures A4-A6 and Table A18)
- More ambitious officials are less likely to target the high turnout neighborhood when both neighborhoods are core than when both are swing (Non-pooled results in Panel B of Figures A15-A20 and Table A19)
- Officials from cities with elections that are concurrent with national elections are less likely to target the high turnout neighborhood when both neighborhoods are core than when both are swing (Non-pooled results in Panel B of Figures A21-A22 and Table A20)

Figure A4: Council-Manager Form of Government



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are from cities with a council-manager form of government.

Figure A5: Mayor-Council Form of Government



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are from cities that use mayor-council form of government.

Figure A6: Not Council-Manager Form of Government



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are from cities that do not use the council-manager form of government. Thus, cities with a mayor-council, commissioner, or town-meeting form of government.

Figure A7: High Population (Top ¼)



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are from cities in the top quarter in terms of population in the sample (pop. ≥ 38,647).

Figure A8: Low Population (Bottom ¾)



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are from cities in the bottom three-quarters in terms of population in the sample (pop. < 38,647).

Figure A9: Officials Elected At-Large (including Mayors)



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are elected at-large, including mayors from cities with mayor-council form of government.

Figure A10: Officials Elected in Districts



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are elected in districts.

Figure A11: Officials Elected At-Large (excluding Mayors)



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are elected at-large, excluding mayors from cities with mayor-council form of government and district elections.

Figure A12: Officials Elected in Districts & Mayors



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are elected in districts or who are mayors in cities with mayor-council form of government and district elections.

Figure A13: Cities with At-Large only Council



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are from cities where all city council members are elected at-large.

Figure A14: Cities with Districts in Council



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are from cities where all or some of the city council members are elected by districts.

Figure A15: More Ambitious Officials (Maestas)



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who have more political ambition based on Maestas (2002) – i.e., they stated a 75% or higher chance of running for higher office within 5 years or plan to stay in their current office for 6 or more years.

Figure A16: Less Ambitious Officials (Maestas)



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who have less political ambition based on Maestas (2002). See note of previous figure for more details.

Figure A17: More Ambitious Officials (Total Years)



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who have more political ambition based on ambition for higher office (i.e., they stated a 75% or higher chance of running for higher office within 5 years) or the combined years that they have been in this office or plan to be in it exceeds 12.

Figure A18: Less Ambitious Officials (Total Years)



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who have less political ambition based on their plans to run for higher office, plans to stay in their current office, and years served in their current office. See note of previous figure for more details.

Figure A19: More Ambitious Officials (Total Yrs. + Pop.)



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who have more political ambition based on their city's population (pop.>75,000), ambition for higher office (i.e., they stated a 75% or higher chance of running for higher office within 5 years) or the combined years that they have been in this office or plan to be in it exceeds 12.

Figure A20: Less Ambitious Officials (Total Yrs. + Pop.)



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who have less political ambition based on their city's population, plans to run for higher office, plans to stay in their current office, and years served in their current office. See note of previous figure for more details.

Figure A21: Elections Concurrent w/ National Elections



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are from cities that hold elections at the same time as national elections.

Figure A22: Elections Not Concurrent w/ National Elections



Note: This shows the results from Figure 1 limited to respondents who are from cities that do not hold elections at the same time as national elections.

Table A18: Officials from municipalities with Mayor-Council form of government are more likely to target high turnout voters than those from Council-Manger form of government (Regression using data from pooled results in Panel B of Figures 1, A4, A5, and A6)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat: Neighborhood 1 is High Turnout (1=yes)	0.57**	0.55**	0.56**	0.58**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)	-0.07	-0.08	-0.16*	-0.14^
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Interaction: Treat X Mayor-Council Form	0.19*	0.22*	0.27**	0.22*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		0.08^	0.08	0.09
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.03	-0.05	-0.14
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.10	-0.12	-0.14
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Is white (1=yes)		0.00	0.13	0.21*
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Log of City Population			-0.02	-0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Seats on Council			0.02*	0.02**
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			0.09	-0.01
			(0.06)	(0.07)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			0.03	0.06
			(0.06)	(0.07)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)				0.02
				(0.06)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			0.02	0.00
			(0.10)	(0.14)
Constant	0.20**	0.24*	0.20	0.19
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.21)	(0.27)
Observations	293	286	251	212
R-squared	0.426	0.427	0.493	0.490

Note: The dependent variable is whether the official chose the first neighborhood (DV=1) over the second neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether the first neighborhood is high turnout as opposed to low turnout. The variable "Interaction: Treat X Mayor-Council Form" interacts the treatment with "Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)." This is a slightly different presentation of the results from Figure 1, which shows the percent choosing the high turnout neighborhood over the low turnout neighborhood instead of the effect of a neighborhood being high turnout on the probability that officials choose it, as is the case here. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A19: High vs. Low Turnout Interacted with Officials' Ambition (Data from non-pooled results in Panel B of Figures 1 and A15 through A20)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat: Both Neighborhoods are Swing (1=yes)	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)	-0.08	-0.08	-0.07	-0.17*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Interaction: Treat X Ambitious	0.24**	0.24**	0.23*	0.34**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		0.03	0.04	0.02
		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.06	-0.05	0.00
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.06	-0.07	-0.12
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		0.01	0.01	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Is white (1=yes)		0.17*	0.20*	0.28**
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Log of City Population			0.01	0.02
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Seats on Council			0.00	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			-0.04	-0.06
			(0.06)	(0.07)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)			-0.00	0.00
			(0.06)	(0.06)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)				-0.02
				(0.06)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			0.13*	0.14*
			(0.05)	(0.06)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			0.02	0.15
			(0.10)	(0.13)
Constant	0.81**	0.63**	0.43*	0.27
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.26)
Observations	312	302	251	212
R-squared	0.035	0.065	0.104	0.144

Note: The dependent variable is whether the official chose the high turnout neighborhood (DV=1) over the low turnout neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether both neighborhoods were swing as opposed to both being core. The variable "Interaction: Treat X Ambitious" interacts the treatment with the variable "Is more ambitious (1=yes)." Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A20: High vs. Low Turnout Interacted with Election Timing (Concurrent or Not with National Elections) (Data from non-pooled results in Panel B of Figures 1, A21, and A22)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat: Both Neighborhoods are Swing (1=yes)	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)	-0.23*	-0.18^	-0.15	-0.14
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Interaction: Treat X Concurrent Elections	0.31**	0.25*	0.23^	0.23^
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Is more ambitious (1=yes)		0.06	0.06	0.03
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Is Mayor (1=yes)		0.02	0.01	-0.01
		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Position is full-time (1=yes)		-0.03	-0.06	-0.01
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Vote margin less than 5 pts. in last election (1=yes)		-0.03	-0.06	-0.11
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Self-placed 7-pt. ideology (7=Very Cons.)		0.01	0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Is white (1=yes)		0.16*	0.20*	0.29**
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Log of City Population			0.01	0.01
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Seats on Council			0.00	0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Elections are partisan (1=yes)			-0.05	-0.09
			(0.06)	(0.07)
City Council is all At-Large (1=yes)				-0.03
				(0.06)
Mayor-Council Form (1=yes)			0.14*	0.14*
			(0.05)	(0.06)
Commissioner Form (1=yes)			0.01	0.15
			(0.10)	(0.14)
Constant	0.84**	0.63**	0.45*	0.31
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.27)
Observations	279	271	251	212
R-squared	0.033	0.055	0.098	0.116

Note: The dependent variable is whether the official chose the high turnout neighborhood (DV=1) over the low turnout neighborhood (DV=0). The treatment is whether both neighborhoods were swing as opposed to both being core. The variable "Interaction: Treat X Concurrent Elections" interacts the treatment with the variable "Elections concurrent with National (1=yes)." Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

References

Banfield, Edward C., and James Q. Wilson. 1963. *City Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press

Bradbury, John Charles, and E. Frank Stephenson. 2003. "Local government structure and public expenditures." *Public Choice* 115(1-2): 185-198.

Burnett, Craig M., and Vladimir Kogan. "Local logrolling? assessing the impact of legislative districting in los angeles." *Urban Affairs Review* 50, no. 5 (2014): 648-671.

Clingermayer, James C., and Richard C. Feiock. 2014. *Institutional constraints and policy choice: An exploration of local governance*. Albany, NY: Suny Press.

Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde, Jürgen Schupp, and Gert G. Wagner. 2010. "Individual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and behavioral consequences." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 9(3): 522-550.

Ehrlich, Sean, and Cherie Maestas. 2010. "Risk orientation, risk exposure, and policy opinions: The case of free trade." *Political Psychology* 31(5): 657-684.

Hajnal, Zoltan L., and Paul G. Lewis. 2003. "Municipal institutions and voter turnout in local elections." *Urban Affairs Review* 38(5): 645-668.

Hajnal, Zoltan L., and Jessica Trounstine. 2010. "Who or what governs?: The effects of economics, politics, institutions, and needs on local spending." *American Politics Research* 38(6): 1130-1163.

Ho, Alfred Tat-Kei. 2011. "PBB in american local governments: it's more than a management tool." *Public Administration Review* 71(3): 391-401.

ICMA. 2003. *The Municipal Yearbook 2003*. Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.

ICMA. 2006. *Municipal Form of Government Survey*. Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.

Kam, Cindy D., and Elizabeth N. Simas. 2010. "Risk orientations and policy frames." *Journal of Politics* 72(2): 381-396.

Langbein, Laura I., Philip Crewson, and Charles Niel Brasher. 1996. "Rethinking ward and at-large elections in cities: Total spending, the number of locations of selected city services, and policy types." *Public Choice* 88(3-4): 275-293.

Lascher Jr, Edward L. 1993 "Explaining the Appeal of Local Legislative Office." *State & Local Government Review* 25(1): 28-38.

Lönnqvist, Jan-Erik, Markku Verkasalo, Gari Walkowitz, and Philipp C. Wichardt. 2015. "Measuring individual risk attitudes in the lab: Task or ask? An empirical comparison." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 119: 254-266.

Lubell, Mark, Richard C. Feiock, and Edgar E. Ramirez De La Cruz. 2009. "Local institutions and the politics of urban growth." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(3): 649-665.

Maestes, Cherie. 2002. “The Incentive to Listen: Progressive Ambition, Resources, and Opinion Monitoring among State Legislators.” *Journal of Politics* 65(2): 439-456.

Maestas, Cherie D., and William M. Pollock. 2010. "Measuring generalized risk orientation with a single survey item." Working Paper #1599867 at SSRN. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1599867.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The electoral connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Oliver, J. Eric, Shang E. Ha, and Zachary Callen. 2012. *Local elections and the politics of small-scale democracy*. Princeton University Press.

Rogers, Steven. (2020) *Accountability in American Legislatures*. Unpublished manuscript, St. Louis University, St. Louis, MO.

Sokolow, Alvin D. 1989. Legislators without ambition: Why small-town citizens seek public office. *State & Local Government Review* 21(1): 23-30.

Trounstine, Jessica. 2010. "Representation and accountability in cities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 407-423.

Trounstine, Jessica. 2013. Turnout and incumbency in local elections. *Urban Affairs Review* 49(2): 167-189.

U.S. Census Bureau (2008) *City Government Finances.* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce. Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances.html

Warshaw, Christopher. 2019. "Local elections and representation in the United States." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22: 461-479.