Supplementary (Online) Appendix for

Do Republican and Democratic Legislators Have Polarized Views of Their District's Demographics?

Further Details of our State Legislator Survey

Figure A1 shows the number of respondents who took the survey from each state while Figure A2 shows the response rate by state. There were no responses from Texas and Idaho where you need to fill out a form that is a screener requiring a within-district address (similar to the United States Congress) to contact each legislator. The darker the color, the larger the number of respondents from that state (the number of responses is listed on the map in the center of each state). The map shows that the survey had fairly good coverage in most states outside of the southwest portion of the country. Further, the legislators come from all levels of legislative professionalism, with good coverage in highly professional legislatures (e.g., New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Illinois), citizen legislatures (e.g., Montana, New Hampshire, Maine, and Utah), and those in between (e.g., Oregon, Missouri, Minnesota, and Connecticut).

Figure A1. Geographic Distribution of State Legislators Participating in Survey



Notes: Darker shades indicate that a larger number of respondents came from that state. The actual number from the state is given in the center of each state on the map.

Figure A2. Survey Participation – Response Rates by State



Notes: Darker shades indicate a higher response rate in the state. The actual number from the state is given in the center of each state on the map.

Table A1: Demographic Makeup of State Legislator Respondents

	All State Legislators	All Respondents	Self-Identified Legislators
Upper Chamber	26%	25%	22%
Republican	53%	43%	45%
Black	8%	6%	5%
Latino	3%	3%	3%
Female	23%	29%	32%

Table A1 compares the demographic characteristics of the legislators in the sample (see columns 2 and 3) relative to all state legislators in the United States (column 1). Female legislators and Democratic legislators were more likely to take the survey. In the United States only 23 percent of the legislators are women, but 32 percent of the legislators who took the survey themselves were women. Similarly, 53 percent of state legislators are Republican but only 45 percent of the legislators who took the survey themselves are Republican. The other characteristics are all within four percentage points of the population average.

In terms of external validity, recent research shows that Internet surveys and traditional mail surveys of state legislators produce similar results (Fisher and Herrick, 2013). Further, the distribution of the data in Figure A1 and Table A2 suggest that the sample provides a fairly good picture of state legislators in the United States.

Table A2. Summary Statistics of Covariates (with Col. 4 of Table 1 as the sample)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	25th	Median	75th	Max.
Legislators' Perception								
% Blue-Collar	683	49.79	20.09	0.00	33.00	50.00	65.00	100.00
% Latino	643	10.11	12.51	0.00	2.00	6.00	12.00	100.00
% Black	651	11.40	15.62	0.00	2.00	5.00	13.00	100.00
% Poverty	689	25.51	17.43	0.00	12.00	20.00	33.00	100.00
% Homeowners	683	62.11	15.38	0.00	50.00	62.00	72.00	100.00
US Census Data								
% Blue-Collar	689	39.71	10.09	8.80	32.60	40.70	47.10	66.70
% Latino	689	7.72	10.91	0.20	1.90	3.80	9.00	82.70
% Black	689	8.65	14.94	0.00	1.00	2.70	8.30	95.20
% Poverty	689	9.38	6.15	0.00	5.10	8.00	12.20	33.30
% Homeowners	689	67.25	14.00	18.00	60.10	70.20	77.00	93.10
Difference: Legislators' Perception – US Census Data								
% Blue-Collar	683	10.14	17.56	-48.80	-2.00	9.50	23.00	69.50
% Latino	643	1.97	7.15	-20.00	-1.30	0.90	4.20	97.00
% Black	651	2.35	7.63	-29.60	-0.70	1.00	4.30	98.80
% Poverty	689	16.14	15.04	-15.70	5.60	12.90	23.70	97.80
% Homeowners	683	-5.22	16.14	-76.10	-15.70	-4.50	5.00	63.00
Absolute Difference: |Legislators' Perception – US Census Data|								
% Blue-Collar	683	16.41	11.91	0.10	6.70	13.80	24.60	69.50
% Latino	643	4.30	6.04	0.00	1.10	2.40	5.60	97.00
% Black	651	4.48	6.61	0.00	0.90	2.30	5.70	98.80
% Poverty	689	16.67	14.45	0.00	5.90	12.90	23.70	97.80
% Homeowners	683	13.11	10.76	0.00	4.70	11.10	19.10	76.10
Other Variables								
Democratic Legislator	689	0.56	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Independent Legislator	689	0.02	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Latino Legislator	689	0.03	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Black Legislator	689	0.04	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Years in Office	689	5.78	5.98	0.00	2.00	4.00	8.00	40.00
Population (10K)	689	5.73	5.88	0.34	1.89	3.66	7.65	55.52
Travel Time (Hours)	537	1.74	1.68	0.00	0.68	1.22	2.35	21.52
Squire Index	689	0.17	0.11	0.03	0.09	0.16	0.22	0.68
Session Length (100 days)	689	1.35	1.26	0.21	0.32	0.90	1.57	3.65
Staff per Legislator	689	3.46	2.91	0.42	1.13	3.09	4.52	17.55
Close Election	689	0.21	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
District Conservatism	689	-0.04	0.31	-1.34	-0.22	-0.01	0.17	0.69
Dem. Pres. Vote Share (2008)	425	0.56	0.17	0.12	0.43	0.55	0.67	0.99

Robustness Checks: Table 1 with Different Controls

Our first set of robustness checks replicate the OLS regression in Table 1 with different control variables. In Table A3, we replicate the analysis from Table 1 but without the variable *Travel Time* since this variable was missing for about 20% of the sample. As displayed in Table A3, the results are nearly identical without this covariate and a larger N.

Table A3. Table 1 Analysis without Travel Time Covariate

Dependent variable = Legislators' Perception – US Census Data	(1) % Blue-Collar	(2) % Latino	(3) % Black	(4) % Poverty	(5) % Home-owners
Democratic Legislator	-3.13	-1.16	-0.80	1.36	0.53
	(1.62)	(0.68)	(0.72)	(1.37)	(1.41)
Independent Legislator	-0.68	-1.20	-4.40*	1.62	11.47*
	(4.70)	(2.04)	(2.17)	(3.99)	(4.11)
Latino Legislator	4.08	-2.77	-1.31	8.21*	-1.74
	(3.97)	(1.61)	(1.71)	(3.37)	(3.54)
Black Legislator	0.29	0.18	-2.21	6.17*	4.63
	(3.44)	(1.43)	(1.49)	(2.94)	(3.06)
Years in Office	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.10
	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Population (10K)	0.01	0.03	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Squire Index	3.43	-0.68	-1.63	-9.30	-6.15
	(7.54)	(3.11)	(3.29)	(6.41)	(6.59)
Close Election	-1.77	-0.31	-0.16	0.25	-3.29*
	(1.70)	(0.73)	(0.76)	(1.44)	(1.49)
District Conservatism	0.53	0.44	1.04	4.87*	-14.40*
	(2.73)	(1.15)	(1.20)	(2.30)	(2.40)
Constant	11.36*	2.65*	3.38*	16.39*	-5.20*
	(1.65)	(0.70)	(0.74)	(1.41)	(1.45)
Observations	684	644	654	689	685
R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.10

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05.

In Table A4, we replicate Table 1 but replace the Squire Index with two of its component parts: number of staff per legislator and length of session. Again, the results are quite similar to those in Table 1.

Table A4. Table 1 Analysis with Alternative Measures of Legislative Professionalism

Dependent variable = Legislators' Perception – US Census Data	(1) % Blue-Collar	(2) % Latino	(3) % Black	(4) % Poverty	(5) % Home-owners
Democratic Legislator	-3.29	-1.39	-1.05	0.13	1.24
	(1.86)	(0.78)	(0.89)	(1.62)	(1.61)
Independent Legislator	-3.30	-2.47	-6.09	8.98	9.90
	(7.05)	(3.03)	(3.49)	(6.19)	(6.16)
Latino Legislator	4.20	-2.92	-0.52	9.10*	3.03
	(4.86)	(1.95)	(2.25)	(4.27)	(4.24)
Black Legislator	0.18	0.32	-1.66	6.74*	3.57
	(3.73)	(1.53)	(1.76)	(3.34)	(3.37)
Years in Office	0.00	-0.02	0.02	0.05	0.17
	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Population (10K)	0.21	0.08	0.00	-0.28	0.06
	(0.23)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Travel Time (Hours)	-0.52	-0.02	0.04	0.42	-0.74
	(0.49)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.43)	(0.42)
Session Length (100 days)	0.26	-0.17	-0.10	-0.91	-0.98
	(0.72)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.63)	(0.62)
Staff per Legislator	-0.24	-0.28	-0.14	0.30	0.10
	(0.36)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Close Election	-2.19	-0.57	-0.68	0.89	-3.24
	(1.92)	(0.81)	(0.92)	(1.68)	(1.68)
District Conservatism	0.95	-0.55	0.38	4.06	-14.26*
	(3.32)	(1.36)	(1.57)	(2.90)	(2.90)
Constant	12.56*	3.72*	4.00*	15.79*	-4.56*
	(1.95)	(0.81)	(0.94)	(1.71)	(1.70)
Observations	534	501	507	537	535
R-squared	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.12

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05.

In Table A5, we replicate Table 1 with state and chamber fixed effects to control for potential, chamber-level confounders. We also exclude the variable *Travel Time* to increase power since it does not affect the results. Again, the results are quite similar to those in Table 1.

Table A5. Table 1 Analysis with State-Chamber Fixed Effects

Dependent variable = Legislators' Perception – US Census Data	(1) % Blue-Collar	(2) % Latino	(3) % Black	(4) % Poverty	(5) % Home-owners
Democratic Legislator	-3.29	-1.02	-0.50	0.74	0.86
	(1.97)	(0.59)	(0.64)	(1.65)	(1.49)
Independent Legislator	-7.61	-1.23	-5.51*	5.29	10.89*
	(5.82)	(1.21)	(2.62)	(5.02)	(1.83)
Latino Legislator	5.36	-4.39*	-1.62	6.90*	-1.58
	(4.13)	(1.75)	(1.49)	(3.43)	(3.33)
Black Legislator	2.25	1.93	-0.20	8.00*	0.76
	(3.54)	(1.38)	(2.85)	(3.56)	(4.48)
Years in Office	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Population (10K)	0.78	0.30	0.29	0.11	-0.01
	(0.77)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.48)
Close Election	-2.39	-0.76	-0.64	0.54	-2.68*
	(1.64)	(0.50)	(0.61)	(1.20)	(1.28)
District Conservatism	2.25	1.93	4.91*	7.66*	-22.39*
	(3.84)	(1.24)	(1.48)	(2.37)	(3.30)
Constant	7.47	1.00	1.30	14.57*	-6.55*
	(4.71)	(1.82)	(2.01)	(2.24)	(2.92)
Observations	684	644	654	689	685
R-squared	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.14
Number of Fixed Effects	84	83	84	84	84

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state-chamber level in parentheses. *p<0.05.

In Table A6, we replicate the analysis from Table 1 but use an alternative measure for district's ideological leanings – the legislative district's vote share for the Democratic candidate in the 2008 Presidential election. Since this variable is not available for many observations, we also exclude the variable *Travel Time* to increase the sample size. Results are very similar if we also include *Travel Time*. Again, the results are quite similar to those in Table 1.

Table A6. Table 1 Analysis with 2008 Presidential Vote Share

Dependent variable = Legislators' Perception – US Census Data	(1) % Blue-Collar	(2) % Latino	(3) % Black	(4) % Poverty	(5) % Home-owners
Democratic Legislator	-3.85	-1.27	-0.81	2.99	-0.63
	(2.40)	(1.08)	(1.22)	(2.06)	(2.20)
Independent Legislator	3.54	-0.22	-6.17	-0.56	12.64*
	(6.00)	(2.65)	(3.17)	(5.18)	(5.55)
Latino Legislator	1.05	-1.22	0.28	5.51	-5.55
	(4.98)	(2.20)	(2.48)	(4.29)	(4.60)
Black Legislator	-0.87	-0.97	-2.07	4.11	0.35
	(3.94)	(1.78)	(1.97)	(3.40)	(3.71)
Years in Office	-0.04	-0.02	-0.00	0.15	0.10
	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Population (10K)	0.05	0.04	0.01	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Squire Index	-0.20	-5.47	-5.81	-5.26	1.46
	(9.35)	(4.19)	(4.70)	(8.05)	(8.61)
Close Election	-2.87	-0.84	-0.00	-0.26	-3.01
	(2.17)	(0.99)	(1.12)	(1.87)	(2.01)
Dem. Pres. Vote Share (2008)	-4.66	-1.32	-4.47	-6.78	23.70*
	(7.05)	(3.15)	(3.55)	(6.06)	(6.50)
Constant	15.70*	4.32*	6.64*	17.82*	-17.49*
	(3.49)	(1.55)	(1.75)	(3.00)	(3.21)
Observations	421	406	409	425	423
R-squared	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.07

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05.

Robustness Checks: Table 1 with Different Dependent Variables

In this set of robustness checks, we replicate the analysis in Table 1 but use different measures of the dependent variable. In Table A7, we begin with the absolute value of the differences between legislators' perceptions and the census estimates (i.e., | Legislator's estimate – Census estimate|). This is similar to the dependent variable used in Broockman and Skovron (2018, Figure 6) and Kalla and Porter (2020).

Table A7. Table 1 Analysis with DV as Absolute Value of Difference between Legislators' Perception and US Census Data

Dependent variable = |Legislators' Perception – US Census Data|	(1) % Blue-Collar	(2) % Latino	(3) % Black	(4) % Poverty	(5) % Home-owners
Democratic Legislator	-0.87	-0.79	-0.10	0.55	-0.32
	(1.24)	(0.66)	(0.76)	(1.54)	(1.12)
Independent Legislator	-4.16	-2.52	-0.75	7.64	2.28
	(4.69)	(2.55)	(2.95)	(5.85)	(4.25)
Latino Legislator	7.30*	2.78	-0.82	8.55*	-0.53
	(3.27)	(1.66)	(1.91)	(4.07)	(2.96)
Black Legislator	3.38	1.96	7.72*	7.25*	0.14
	(2.50)	(1.29)	(1.49)	(3.17)	(2.33)
Years in Office	-0.06	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Population (10K)	-0.12	0.07	0.06	-0.05	0.15
	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Travel Time (Hours)	0.40	-0.03	-0.06	0.63	0.59*
	(0.32)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.40)	(0.29)
Squire Index	1.32	-0.75	-0.17	-11.27	-7.75
	(5.75)	(2.95)	(3.40)	(7.15)	(5.19)
Close Election	-1.08	-1.04	-1.01	0.64	1.38
	(1.28)	(0.68)	(0.78)	(1.60)	(1.16)
District Conservatism	2.39	-0.09	0.27	4.18	-1.42
	(2.18)	(1.14)	(1.31)	(2.71)	(1.97)
Constant	16.84*	4.22*	4.47*	16.62*	12.13*
	(1.36)	(0.72)	(0.83)	(1.69)	(1.23)
Observations	534	501	507	537	535
R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.02

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05.

In Table A8, we use legislators' estimates of their district's demographics as the dependent variable. Since the actual Census data correlates with the dependent variable and the key independent variable (legislator's partisanship), we include the actual Census estimates in the regression to control for this likely confounder. (For example, districts with more minorities are also more likely to elect a Democratic legislator.) This specification also allows us to use the R-squared to examine how well the actual data predicts the legislators' perceptions. The results are similar to those in Table 1 in that we fail to find a significant coefficient on the variable *Democratic Legislator*. The R-squared in each regression also shows that state legislators are most accurate with % Black (R-squared = .77) and % Latino (R-squared = .67). But that accuracy drops significantly with the other characteristics and is lowest with % Blue-Collar and % Homeowners (R-squared = .21).

Table A8. Table 1 Analysis with DV as Legislators' Perceptions

Dependent variable = Legislators' Perception	(1) % Blue-Collar	(2) % Latino	(3) % Black	(4) % Poverty	(5) % Home-owners
Democratic Legislator	-3.50	-1.31	-0.78	-0.37	-1.20
	(1.85)	(0.77)	(0.87)	(1.60)	(1.48)
Independent Legislator	-3.01	-2.75	-6.06	8.10	5.95
	(6.96)	(2.98)	(3.40)	(6.01)	(5.52)
Latino Legislator	4.82	-0.48	-0.58	6.41	-0.60
	(4.87)	(2.08)	(2.21)	(4.22)	(3.86)
Black Legislator	0.88	0.08	3.77	1.87	0.62
	(3.77)	(1.51)	(2.18)	(3.45)	(3.05)
Years in Office	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.06	0.18
	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Population (10K)	0.06	0.07	0.05	-0.13	-0.11
	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Travel Time (Hours)	-0.48	-0.01	0.00	0.31	-1.14*
	(0.49)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.41)	(0.38)
Squire Index	5.27	-2.13	-3.74	-11.42	1.81
	(8.53)	(3.45)	(3.93)	(7.35)	(6.81)
Close Election	-1.91	-0.67	-0.96	0.81	-2.93
	(1.91)	(0.80)	(0.90)	(1.64)	(1.51)
District Conservatism	2.21	-0.95	-0.67	4.14	-3.10
	(3.37)	(1.34)	(1.53)	(2.78)	(2.74)
% Blue Collar Workers (Census)	0.90*				
	(0.08)				
% Latino (Census)		0.89*			
		(0.03)			
% Black (Census)			0.87*		
			(0.03)		
% in Poverty (Census)				1.51*	
				(0.11)	
% Homeowners (Census)					0.47*
					(0.05)
Constant	15.92*	3.71*	4.66*	12.76*	33.40*
	(3.66)	(0.84)	(0.96)	(1.89)	(3.86)
Observations	534	501	507	537	535
R-squared	0.24	0.67	0.77	0.31	0.21

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05.

Robustness Checks: Modeling Figures 2 and 3

In this section, we run several regressions to create a modeled version of Figures 2 and 3 from the main paper and ensure that the results displayed in Figures 2 and 3 are robust to controls for potential confounders. To do this, we run the same regression from Table A8 but also interact the Census estimates with the legislator's partisanship. The results of these regressions are displayed in Table A9. In Figure A4, we plot the predicted outcomes from these models by legislators' party and the Census measures of their district's characteristics to compare the results to the raw data plotted in Figures 2 and 3. These results are also robust to specifications that use a quadratic function for the Census measures of district characteristics. Together, the results in Tables A6 and A7 and Figure A4 demonstrate that the results in Figures 1 and 2 are robust to control variables.

Table A9. Modeling Legislators' Perceptions with Interactions and Controls

Dependent variable = Legislators' Perception	(1) % Blue-Collar	(2) % Latino	(3) % Black	(4) % Poverty	(5) % Home-owners
Democratic Legislator	-7.93	-0.64	-0.35	2.55	-11.91
	(7.00)	(0.90)	(0.97)	(2.68)	(7.35)
% Blue Collar Workers (Census)	0.82*				
	(0.14)				
Dem. Leg. X % Blue Collar	0.11				
	(0.17)				
% Latino (Census)		0.98*			
		(0.07)			
Dem. Leg. X % Latino		-0.11			
		(0.08)			
% Black (Census)			0.95*		
			(0.08)		
Dem. Leg. X % Black			-0.09		
			(0.09)		
% in Poverty (Census)				1.78*	
				(0.23)	
Dem. Leg. X % in Poverty				-0.36	
				(0.26)	
% Homeowners (Census)					0.37*
					(0.08)
Dem. Leg. X % Homeowners					0.15
					(0.10)
Independent Legislator	-3.56	-2.56	-6.26	8.31	4.64
	(7.02)	(2.98)	(3.41)	(6.01)	(5.58)
Latino Legislator	4.32	-0.15	-0.51	7.08	-0.32
	(4.93)	(2.09)	(2.21)	(4.25)	(3.86)
Black Legislator	0.68	0.11	4.21	2.67	0.89
	(3.79)	(1.51)	(2.22)	(3.50)	(3.05)
Years in Office	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.06	0.19
	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Population (10K)	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.11	-0.10
	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Travel Time (Hours)	-0.45	-0.02	0.02	0.27	-1.18*
	(0.49)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.41)	(0.38)
Squire Index	5.72	-2.03	-3.83	-12.26	1.17
	(8.56)	(3.45)	(3.94)	(7.37)	(6.82)
Close Election	-1.98	-0.68	-0.96	0.70	-3.38*
	(1.91)	(0.80)	(0.90)	(1.64)	(1.54)
District Conservatism	2.08	-1.00	-0.93	3.85	-3.57
	(3.38)	(1.34)	(1.55)	(2.79)	(2.76)
Constant	19.03*	3.24*	4.32*	10.73*	41.06*
	(5.99)	(0.90)	(1.02)	(2.41)	(6.44)
Observations	534	501	507	537	535
R-squared	0.24	0.67	0.77	0.31	0.21

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05.

Figure A4. Predicted Measure of Legislators' Perceptions by District Characteristic and Partisanship Based on Models in Table A9



Robustness Checks: Comparing Legislators' Perceptions to Voters' Demographics

Another potential issue with our analysis is that there is no guarantee that the legislators were necessarily thinking about their district as a whole. Though the question specifically asked legislators to think about their district as a whole, they may have had in mind the just the voters in their district. If so we might be missing potential partisan differences by looking in the wrong places.

Eitan Hersh provided the district-level estimates for voters and registrants in the district. His data is based on using data from Catalist. The estimates are created by weighting the registrants and voters by the census block characteristics.[1] Figure A5 provides the relationship between legislators' perceptions and the Catalist-based estimates for how these demographics would change based on voters. Figure A6 provides the parallel results when using registered voters as the baseline. Figures A5 and A6 show similar patterns to those found in Figures 2 and 3. Most importantly, there is still no partisan gap in perceptions of district demographics.

Table A3 shows that the results in Table 1 are robust to measuring the dependent variable as the absolute difference between legislators' estimates and the Census measure of district demographics. In fact, the partisan differences become even smaller in this alternative specification.

[1] Hersh, Eitan, and Clayton Nall. 2016. "The Primacy of Race in the Geography of Income-Based Voting: New Evidence from Public Voting Records." American Journal of Political Science. 60 (2): 289-303.

Figure A5. Catalist Voters



Figure A6. Catalist Registrants



Differences in Accuracy Across District Characteristics

In Table A10, we compare the accuracy of state legislators' perceptions across the five district characteristics. To do so, we use the absolute value of the difference in legislators' perceptions and the Census measure as the dependent variable but include the state legislators' estimates of each of the five district characteristics in the same model. Thus, there are five observations per state legislator, one for each district characteristic that they estimated in the survey. We include four indicator variables to indicate whether the dependent variable is measuring the difference (between the state legislators' perception and Census data) with regards to % Blue Collar Workers (*DV = Blue Collar*), % Black (*DV = Black*), % in Poverty (*DV = Poverty*), and % Homeowners (*DV = % Homeowners*). The indicator variable for the difference with regards to % Latino is the baseline category.

These results, together with Figures 1, 2, and A4 and the R-squared on the models in Tables A8 and A9, indicate that state legislators are most accurate in their perceptions about the racial composition of their district (coeff. on *DV = Black* = 1) and least accurate in their perception of poverty levels (coeff. = 13) and the number of blue collar workers (coeff. = 12) with perceptions of homeownership rates (coeff. = 9) approaching those levels of inaccuracy as well. In other words, compared to state legislators' perceptions of the racial composition of their district, the difference between their perception and the Census measure of poverty levels in their district are about 12 to 13 percentage points larger.

Table A10. Comparing Legislators' Accuracy Across District Characteristics

	(1)
Dependent variable = |Legislators' Perception – US Census Data|	
Indicator Variable, DV = Blue Collar	12.18*
	(0.55)
Indicator Variable, DV = Black	0.65*
	(0.29)
Indicator Variable, DV = Poverty	12.55*
	(0.65)
Indicator Variable, DV = Homeowners	8.99*
	(0.54)
Democratic Legislator	-0.30
	(0.64)
Independent Legislator	0.59
	(1.72)
Latino Legislator	3.45*
	(1.72)
Black Legislator	4.10*
	(1.00)
Years in Office	0.02
	(0.04)
Population (10K)	0.02
	(0.07)
Travel Time (Hours)	0.31
	(0.18)
Squire Index	-3.81
	(3.27)
Close Election	-0.19
	(0.55)
District Conservatism	1.06
	(0.93)
Constant	3.98*
	(0.88)
Observations	2,614
R-squared	0.21

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state legislator level in parentheses. *p<0.05.