Supplementary Online Appendix for

The Policy Implications of Political Ambition: Does Ambition Influence How Local Officials Respond to Electoral and Non-Electoral Service Requests?

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A. Survey of Local Public Officials

The survey was conducted in two waves sent to two different samples of municipal officials. Invitations to the first wave were sent in May and June of 2016 to a sample of 27,862 elected mayors and legislators (e.g., city councilors, aldermen, supervisors, etc.) from 4,187 cities. Subjects were recruited via emails with a link to the survey. We sent each potential subject three emails one to two weeks apart, inviting them to participate. The sample was compiled by a for-profit organization that gathers contact information and email addresses of public officials from municipalities that have a website and a population above 10,000. The organization uses webcrawler software to identify when information changes on the contact pages of each city's website and then has research assistants update its contact list of officials accordingly. Unfortunately, this approach has a high error rate. Based on Qualtrics' email tracking, only 18,567 (or 67%) of the email invitations were delivered to an active email address. In addition, we looked up a sample of 832 officials in the list and found that only 44% of the email addresses were accurate. 2,165 officials answered questions on the first wave of the survey, resulting in a response rate of 17.8% based on the number of accurate emails in the list.[1] This rate is similar to those from other surveys of municipal officials (e.g., Butler and Dynes (2016) report a response rate of 23%).

The second wave of the survey was conducted in June and July of 2016. The sample consisted of the email addresses of elected mayors and city councilors (or equivalent) originally gathered in 2012 and 2014. Excluding the email addresses that were also included in the first wave resulted in a list of 29,250 emails. The email addresses collected in 2012 were gathered in January through March of 2012 by a team of undergraduate research assistants who searched for the website of 26,566 US municipalities. The email addresses collected in 2014 were gathered in a similar fashion in early 2014 but excluded municipalities with a population below 3,000 due to the low percentage of small towns with websites. Given that these email addresses were gathered 2 to 4 years prior to this research project, we knew that a large percentage of the emails and names of the officials (in the case of cities that use generic email accounts for each office) would no longer be accurate. Indeed, 26% of the emails sent through Qualtrics were undeliverable. It is likely that many more of the email addresses are no longer monitored though they remain active. With 1,500 officials participating in the second wave of the survey in 2016, the response rate for the second round was 6.9%, although this probably vastly underestimates the true response rate given that many email addresses were likely no longer monitored.

The graphs and figures in this section provide additional descriptive statistics about the officials and municipalities in our sample as well as all municipalities across the U.S. The population of municipalities and demographic data on them are from the U.S. Census Bureau. We defined municipalities as general-purpose local governments using the following categorizations from the Census Bureau:

- Incorporated Places: In most states, they are called cities, towns, boroughs, and villages.
- Consolidated Cities: These are a "unit of government for which the functions of an Incorporated Place and its county or Minor Civil Divisions have merged."[2]

1 The 17.8% is calculated as follows: 2,165/(.4375*27,862).

2 U.S. Census Bureau. 2012. \Geographic Terms and Concepts { County Subdivision", http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc cousub.html (January 9, 2014).

- Minor Civil Divisions (MCDs) in CT, ME, MA, MI, MN, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT, and WI. In these states, they are usually called townships or towns. We included Minor Civil Divisions from these states based on the Census Bureau's assessment that "Most of the MCDs in [these] twelve states ... serve as general-purpose local governments that can perform the same governmental functions as incorporated places."[3]

This resulted in a list of 24,083 municipalities. In the tables and figures, we use the term city instead of municipality to save space.

Tables A.2 and A.3 display the percent of respondents from each state as well as the percent of officials emailed from each state (i.e., respondents and non-respondents). The last column in both tables displays the percent of all municipalities from each state. As illustrated by these tables, respondents come from all states, save for Hawaii, and the percent from each state is similar to the percent of officials emailed from each state, though some states appear to have higher response rates than others. These results, combined with those in Tables A.4, clearly show that our sample of municipal officials are quite diverse in terms of the states and types of municipalities they represent.

3 Ibid.

Table A.1: Respondents from Each State (AL-MT)

	Respondents from each state		Officials Emailed from each state	Munic-palities in each state
	Freq.	Percent	Percent	Percent
Alabama	31	0.91%	1.55%	1.85%
Alaska	9	0.26%	0.37%	0.61%
Arizona	45	1.32%	1.43%	0.38%
Arkansas	35	1.02%	1.25%	2.00%
California	230	6.72%	6.89%	2.09%
Colorado	71	2.08%	2.26%	1.13%
Connecticut	68	1.99%	1.91%	0.80%
Delaware	12	0.35%	0.36%	0.23%
District of Columbia	0	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%
Florida	113	3.30%	3.70%	1.80%
Georgia	57	1.67%	2.31%	2.20%
Hawaii	0	0.00%	0.03%	0.04%
Idaho	16	0.47%	0.55%	0.81%
Illinois	207	6.05%	6.32%	5.21%
Indiana	56	1.64%	2.07%	2.29%
Iowa	72	2.10%	1.71%	3.79%
Kansas	43	1.26%	1.17%	2.51%
Kentucky	32	0.94%	1.37%	1.68%
Louisiana	12	0.35%	0.60%	1.23%
Maine	40	1.17%	1.23%	2.13%
Maryland	45	1.32%	0.89%	0.77%
Massachusetts	126	3.68%	2.73%	1.60%
Michigan	200	5.85%	4.77%	6.46%
Minnesota	134	3.92%	3.83%	3.63%
Mississippi	25	0.73%	0.73%	1.20%
Missouri	112	3.27%	2.71%	3.84%
Montana	11	0.32%	0.26%	0.53%

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Table A.2: Respondents from Each State (NE-WY)

	Respondents from each state		Officials Emailed from each state	Municipalities in each state
	Freq.	Percent	Percent	Percent
Nebraska	10	0.29%	0.52%	2.13%
Nevada	9	0.26%	0.14%	0.09%
New Hampshire	22	0.64%	0.76%	1.03%
New Jersey	131	3.83%	4.60%	2.40%
New Mexico	27	0.79%	0.71%	0.43%
New York	228	6.66%	5.54%	6.44%
North Carolina	131	3.83%	2.92%	2.24%
North Dakota	14	0.41%	0.35%	1.43%
Ohio	145	4.24%	4.93%	3.85%
Oklahoma	26	0.76%	0.82%	2.37%
Oregon	74	2.16%	1.62%	0.97%
Pennsylvania	136	3.98%	3.96%	4.82%
Rhode Island	17	0.50%	0.54%	0.18%
South Carolina	26	0.76%	1.09%	1.08%
South Dakota	13	0.38%	0.36%	1.25%
Tennessee	66	1.93%	1.49%	1.42%
Texas	137	4.00%	5.47%	4.91%
Utah	65	1.90%	1.29%	0.99%
Vermont	24	0.70%	0.60%	1.17%
Virginia	65	1.90%	1.37%	1.01%
Washington	64	1.87%	2.22%	1.16%
West Virginia	24	0.70%	0.54%	0.93%
Wisconsin	147	4.30%	4.78%	6.49%
Wyoming	18	0.53%	0.34%	0.39%
Total	3,421	100%	100%	100%

Table A.4 provides descriptive statistics about the municipalities in and out of our sample. The data come from multiple sources, as indicated in the notes on Table A3. Column 1 displays information about all municipalities. It is important to note that the large majority of cities are small, rural, and overwhelmingly non-Latino white. The mean population is just 9,118 while the median population is 1,324. To provide an additional comparison to the types of municipalities where most Americans live, Column 2 displays the same descriptive information except that the sample of all municipalities is weighted based on each municipality's population as a proportion of the total population of all municipalities. With these weights, the mean city's population jumps to 583,120 and the median's is 62,298. This is more reflective of where most Americans live. For instance, if all of the municipalities are ordered by population from smallest to largest, the median resident across all cities would be found in Maple Grove City, MN, a suburban city

with a population of 61,567, which is right at the median in the population weighted results in Column (2). The 25th percentile resident is in a city of 17,000 while the 75th percentile is in one of 260,000.

In column (3), we display data on municipalities that had at least one official who was invited to participate in the survey. In other words, these are the municipalities of officials in our sampling frame. Finally, in column (4), we have data on municipalities that had at least one respondent to the survey—i.e., our actual sample. Overall, the municipalities of officials whom we emailed or who responded are quite similar to each other and fall between the municipalities where most Americans reside (Column [2]) and the broader sample of all municipalities (Column [1]), with the municipalities with respondents (Column [4]) slightly more similar to those in Column (2) than the municipalities emailed (Column [3]).

Figures A.2 through A.4 display a density plot of the different municipal characteristics found in table A.4. What stands out is how similar municipalities with respondents are to all of the municipalities with officials included in the sampling frame. The one area where the distributions are most different are in population, in which respondents were more likely to be from slightly larger municipalities.

Table A.3: Characteristics of Municipalities by Sample Status

		(1) All Cities	(2) All Cities, weighted by pop.	(3) Cities Emailed	(4) Cities w/ at least 1 Respon-dent
City Population	Mean	9,118	583,120	26,001	39,969
	Median	1,324	62,298	7,481	11,936
% Population Minority	Mean	15.5%	33.3%	21.3%	21.6%
	Median	5.8%	28.3%	12.0%	13.2%
% Population w/ Some College or More	Mean	19.5%	18.6%	19.8%	19.8%
	Median	19.3%	18.4%	19.8%	19.8%
Median Income (in 2012 $1,000)	Mean	$46.9	$55.6	$55.0	$56.3
	Median	$41.8	$48.1	$48.5	$50.2
% Population Not in Labor Force	Mean	28.4%	28.0%	28.4%	28.1%
	Median	27.3%	27.0%	27.3%	27.2%
% Population Unemployed	Mean	8.5%	9.1%	8.6%	8.5%
	Median	7.5%	8.7%	7.8%	7.7%
% Population Homeowners	Mean	16.2%	17.3%	17.3%	17.3%
	Median	16.3%	17.3%	17.3%	17.3%
% Population with 2nd Mortgage	Mean	0.8%	1.0%	1.1%	1.1%
	Median	0.6%	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%
Form of Government					
% Mayor/Council without City Manager		65.7%	50.6%	53.9%	50.8%
% Mayor/Council with City Manager		14.8%	40.0%	29.9%	36.4%
% Commissioners		1.6%	1.3%	1.2%	1.5%
% Supervisors		17.5%	8.0%	14.6%	11.2%
% Town Meeting		0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%
% Representative Town Meeting		0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.0%
% with some Town Meeting decision-making		17.6%	8.6%	5.9%	11.2%
% with Home Rule Charter		19.6%	47.5%	30.9%	36.3%
% with Republican Rep. in U.S. House		47.5%	38.7%	51.1%	49.5%
Citizens' Policy Preferences (only for cities w/ pop. at or above 25k; range: -1 to .6; higher = more conservative)	Mean	-0.08	-0.18	-0.07	-0.08
	Median	-0.05	-0.15	-0.03	-0.04

Notes: Column (1) includes all cities, towns, Population figures are from the 2010 U.S. Census. Form of government figures are from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2012 Census of Governments. The partisanship of the Representative of the U.S. House that represents each city is based on Congressional membership in March, 2016. Cities that crossed multiple House districts were matched to the district in which a plurality of the city's population resided. Citizens' Policy Preferences are from The American Ideology Project, which are estimated based on surveys conducted from 2000 to 2011. See Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) for more details on this measure.

Figure A.1: Density Plot of Municipalities' Population by Sample Status



Figure A.2: Density Plot of Municipal Characteristics from Table A3, Part I



Figure A.3: Density Plot of Municipal Characteristics from Table A3, Part II



Table A.5 displays individual level data on the officials emailed (the sampling frame) and the actual respondents (the sample). In general, there are very little data available on municipal officials outside of the data we gather in the survey. However, based on the officials' titles, which we collect for all officials emailed, we can identify mayors in the sampling frame. The results in Table A.5 indicate that mayors in municipalities without city managers, meaning these mayors were the chief executive in charge of their municipality's daily operations, were more likely to respond to our survey request than members of the main legislative body (e.g., city council). On the other hand, mayors in cities with city managers, meaning these mayors were a member of the governing legislative body and not the chief executive of the municipality, responded at similar rates as the other legislators in their municipalities. Finally, we are also able to identify officials' gender as it is indicated in the list we used from the for-profit organization that gathers elected officials' contact information. For those gathered from municipal websites, we identified officials' gender based on the proportion of females with that first name in public social security records. Female officials were more likely to respond, though this difference is substantively small.

Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics of Officials Emailed and Respondents

		Officials Emailed	Respondents
% Mayors			
In cities without City Managers	Mean	13.4%	18.0%
	95% C.I.	(12.9%, 13.9%)	(16.1%, 19.9%)
In cities with City Managers	Mean	11.2%	12.7%
	95% C.I.	(10.7%, 11.7%)	(11.0%, 14.3%)
% Female	Mean	28.3%	31.5%
	95% C.I.	(27.8%, 28.7%)	(29.9%, 33.0%)

Finally, to illustrate that our sample of officials is diverse in terms of other politically important variables, we provide some descriptive statistics on the sample in table A.6 and figures A.5 – A.6. These data are from responses in the survey and show that our sample of officials vary significantly in terms of their partisan identity, self-placed ideology, term limits, partisan status of elections, electoral vulnerability, tenure, views on representation, static ambition, and progressive ambition.

Figure A.4: Histogram of Years Served in Current Seat



Notes: Histogram shows response to question: "How many years have you served in your current office?" Response options ranged from 1 to 29 in one year increments and "30 or more."

Figure A.5: Histogram of Years Planning to Serve in Current Office



Notes: Histogram shows response to question: "How many years do you hope to serve in your current office?" Response options ranged from 1 to 19 in one year increments and "20 or more."

Table A.5: Characteristics of Respondents based on Survey Questions and Responses

Q: What party do you identify with?

	%
Republican	35.3
Democrat	34.0
Independent or Unaffiliated	27.0
Other	3.7
TOTAL	100

Q: Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as:

	%
Very Liberal	3.6
Liberal	12.8
Somewhat Liberal	14.3
Middle of the Road	24.6
Somewhat Conservative	21.7
Conservative	20.0
Very Conservative	3.1
TOTAL	100

Q: Which of the following best describes how individuals are elected to your position?

	%
The elections are NON-PARTISAN (i.e., candidates' party DOES NOT appear on the ballot)	73.0
The elections are PARTISAN (i.e., candidates' party appear on the ballot)	27.0
TOTAL	100

Q: Are there term limits for your current office?

	%
Yes	19.3
No	80.7
TOTAL	100

Q: By how many percentage points did you win your last election for this office?

	%
below 1% point	2.3
1 to almost 5% points	7.7
5 to 15% points	18.8
More than 15% points	34.8
I ran uncontested	32.3
I lost or did not run again	4.1
TOTAL	100

Q: When it comes to important issues, elected officials should…

	%
(1) Do what their constituents want, even if it conflicts with what the elected official thinks is right.	4.0
(2)	11.4
(3)	24.1
(4)	40.5
(5) Do what they think is right, even if it conflicts with what their constituents want.	20.0
TOTAL	100

B. Email Correspondence Experiment

Using a list of generic first and last names, we created ten (five male, five female) Gmail accounts from which we sent requests to the officials who had previously participated in our survey. The accounts were created with the names: Amy Bennett, Andrea Davis, Ann Thomas, Eric Bennett, Jason Anderson, Joshua Wood, Melissa Wood, Michael Davis, Tiffany Anderson, and Will Thomas. In other work, we also looked at the effect of gender on the responsiveness of male and female elected officials. We found no effect of gender of the constituent on the responsiveness of elected officials, nor were public officials more responsive to constituents who share their gender.

Figure A.7: Examples of Email Requests



Box A.1: Email Treatment Text

Subject:	Quick Question / Help with a question / Request for Assistance
Salutation:	[BLANK] / Hello / Hi / Dear
Recipient's Name:	[BLANK] / [TITLE] [LASTNAME] / [FIRSTNAME LASTNAME]
Punctuation:	[BLANK] / : / ,
Introduction:	[BLANK] / For whatever reason, I couldn't find this online. / I've been in the area a little while, but / I'm newer to the area and
Segue:	I'm trying to figure out / I was wondering if you could help me figure out / I wanted to know / I was wondering / I was wondering if you could tell me
Recycling Service Treatment:	what can be recycled and what cannot. Do you know [that information or where I might find it / the answer or where I could find this out]?
Voter Registration Service Treatment:	how long I need to live here before I can register to vote. Do you know [the answer or where I could find this out / that information or where I might find it]?
Valediction:	[BLANK] / Thanks, / Best wishes, / Sincerely, / Thanks for considering this request, / Regards, / Best, / Thanks in advance, / I appreciate the help,
Sender's Name:	Amy / Amy Bennett / Andrea / Andrea Davis / Ann / Ann Thomas / Eric / Eric Bennett / Jason / Jason Anderson / Joshua / Joshua Wood / Melissa / Melissa Wood / Michael / Michael Davis / Tiffany / Tiffany Anderson / Will / Will Thomas
Sender's Email Address:	andersonjason424@gmail.com / andersontiffany424@gmail.com / annthomas.blue@gmail.com / bennett.amy149@gmail.com / davisandrea.aac@gmail.com / davismichael.aac@gmail.com / ebennett5661@gmail.com / willthomas.blue@gmail.com / woodjoshua.93@gmail.com / woodmelissa93@gmail.com

Notes: The above is the text used to create the emails sent to the elected municipal officials in the email correspondence study. Figure 1 shows an actual email sent using the text above. Assignment to the different conditions were not completely independent of the other conditions in the following cases: 1) Every official received two service request emails, one about recycling and one about registering to vote (and a third email with a request for the elected officials position on a policy which we do not analyze here) 2) The email addresses were associated with a specific sender's name. 3) No official received more than 1 email from senders with the same last name (there are five last names among the senders and associated email addresses and a male and female first name associated with each last name.)

C. Ethical Considerations

Although federal ethics guidelines at the time this study was carried out classifed research involving elected officials as subjects as exempt from Institutional Review Board review requirements (and indeed, the two IRBs to which we submitted both agreed on this point and ruled the research exempt), we detail here some ethical concerns we think warranted consideration in the implementation of this research design. As correspondence studies have become a more utilized method in the social scientist research toolbox, we need to consider the costs of such designs relative to the benefits they provide.

In using this tool, we should think about a couple of ethical considerations. The first of these is the use of deception combined with the lack of informed consent. In our experiment we used fictitious aliases when contacting city officials. The need to measure actual behavior (which may be significantly different from stated behavior measured from survey experiments when stated behaviors might be influenced by social norms (Berinsky 1999)) and the large number of municipalities in the study necessitates the use of fictitious aliases. Such a design to measure the responsiveness to constituent requests (and how they vary by elected official ambition) in so many municipalities could not feasibly be carried out without the use of fictitious alias. The benefit of understanding how ambition affects actual behaviors provides the motivation for using such a research method.

The key to the acceptability of the use of deception, however, is whether the benefits of the knowledge accrued through the use of deception outweigh the harm done to the subjects or to others through the use of deception. Although it is possible to imagine situations where experimental deception might cause psychological or physical harm to participation or others, we felt that, with the proper cautions used to maintain respondent anonymity so as to not harm the reputation of any participant, individual harm was limited to the normal frustrations that public officials might have when dealing with constituents.

Beyond individual harm, it is important to also consider the burden placed on public officials and possible downstream effects. Given the necessity of seeing how public officials choose to respond and to spend time and effort, which is the best way to understand their priorities (Hall 1996), some burden is necessary. At the same time, it is important to try to limit the work load imposed on these public officials. While we needed electoral and non-electoral topics, we attempted to identify topics that would be relatively easy to respond to. The length of response from officials (around 50 words) and the difficulty of acquiring the information to respond to our request is in line with other low cost correspondence experiments (e.g. Butler and Broockman 2011). Given the norms of acceptable requests that have been established, we did not feel these requests were overburdening or even more time consuming or out of the range of what would normally be expected of a public official (see Oliver (2012) Chapter 7 for more details).

There is also the question of whether the total time spent collectively by public officials might impede their responsiveness to the public in general. We do recognize that the number of requests sent to about 2,800 public officials may result in what seems like a substantive amount of time. However, even here, we tried to minimize the potential influence it would have on the ability to respond to constituents. We specifically did not contact public officials for whom we did not have a survey response. Although we had working email addresses for 40,128 public officials, we only conducted the correspondence experiment on 2,806 (a number we believed would provide sufficient power necessary based on previous studies). On the whole, we estimate that our correspondence experiment went to about 1.6% of local public officials in the United

States (a representative sample (see the online appendix), but a small sample nonetheless).[4] Thus, while the time volume may appear large, when put into context, it is not nor is it likely that our requests had any substantive effect on the behavior of public officials generally or the provision of services to constituents.

Lastly, we also recognize that correspondence studies might change the behavior of public officials as they become more sensitized to the possibility that they are being studied which may cause them to ignore or disregard genuine requests for assistance and information. Although the number of emails we sent might increase that risk, as we mentioned previously, we went to great lengths to randomize every possible part of the request to minimize the likelihood of detection. The consistency in the response rates (and the high level of responsiveness) of the local public officials across the three waves of the survey strongly suggests to us that this randomization and staggered distribution was successful.

D. Coding the Emails

We downloaded the content from each email account merged them and converted the files to one .csv file. That file had the complete text each of each email and two id variable columns we used to merge our content analysis results with the survey data. Our final corpus of cleaned emails included 7,600 email responses. A small number of those are follow-up responses from the original sender. For the analyses in this paper, follow-up responses are combined with original responses, which slightly lowers the N on our analyses.

Following Druckman and Parkin (2005) and Druckman (2014), we hired a research assistant to go through each of the emails and code them according to the codebook below. We then recruited a team of coders who completed the coding activity for course credit using the same instructions. Each volunteer was assigned a random set of approximately 700 emails, which they were expected to code. Two other coders also coded the same set of 700 emails. The files were anonymized, such that the volunteers could not identify who had the same set of emails to code. Here is the breakdown of the inter-rater reliability measures for the items we use in this paper:

- Do they encourage recycling or thank the emailer for recycling (alpha=0.653)
- Do they encourage recycling or thank the emailer for voting (alpha=0.644)

To account for the discrepancy in coding on the items, we employ a majority rule coding scheme. If two or more coders coded the item as yes (1), we also do so in our analyses. When only one of the coders marked it as yes (1), we code it as a zero. We also note that the encourage/gratitude recycling scores percent agreement is 83 and the encourage/gratitude for voting percent agreement is 84.5, both of which exceed the recommended threshold (McHugh 2012).

1. Content Analysis Coding Instructions

You have been given a spreadsheet with several columns. Your job is to fill in the empty columns with numbers consistent with the coding scheme described below. You are to fill in columns E through N based on the text in column A, WITHOUT editing the other columns. You are to read the text found in the column (Text to Edit) and decide the appropriate numbers to fill in the blank columns based on your reading of the text. This means that you must read the entire

4 With an estimated 35,000 city and town governments in the U.S. (as of the 2012 census) each with approximately 5 councilors, the total population of local elected officials is approximately 175,000 (not including county governments). The 2,806 contacted thus represents about 1.6% of that population.

text. Be as objective as possible. Other people have been randomly assigned to code some of the same text as you, so we can measure the accuracy of your coding scheme. If you put in values that do not make sense, we will easily be able to identify what you are doing.

If the text in cell A is something other than communication with an elected official, <u>leave all of the cells blank</u> for that row.

Text to Edit = body text of email that RA's should clean up so that it doesn't have our original email in it.

- **e) Do they encourage the person to recycle?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **f) Do they encourage the person to vote and/or register to vote?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **g) Do they express gratitude to the person (or thank them) for their interest in recycling?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **h) Do they express gratitude to the person (or thank them) for their interest in voting or willingness to vote?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **i) Do they invite the person to contact them <u>if</u> they have any additional questions or problems?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **j) Do they ask the person to contact them to talk about the person's question or request in more detail?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **k) Do they say that they are <u>in favor of</u> bringing more business into the community or allowing more commercial or retail development?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **l) Do they say that they <u>are opposed</u> to bringing more business into the community or allowing more commercial or retail development?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **m) Do they say that they are <u>in favor of</u> parks, preserving green space, or keeping a small town feel?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **n) Do they say that they <u>are opposed to</u> parks, preserving green space, or keeping a small town feel?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **o) Do they mention things that <u>they have done</u> in office to preserve the small town feel, or stop new retail, commercial or industrial development?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **p) Do they mention things that <u>they have done</u> in office to bring new business to town or to promote new retail, commercial or industrial development?** 0=no, 1=yes
- **q) Do they ask the person any follow-up or clarification questions?** 0=no, 1=yes

2. Examples of how to code the text:

<u>Example 1:</u>
Dear Michael,
I am attaching a copy of the recycling guide. You can also find it at the town's website, [redacted], under the Frequently Asked Questions menu.
If you plan to vote in November you can save time on election day by registering in advance. If you do that ahead of time your name will be on the poll list and all you have to remember is to bring your photo I.D. when you come to vote. Let me know if you would like to do this.
[redacted name]

e) 0

f) 1
g) 0
h) 0
i) 0
j) 1
k) 0
l) 0
m) 0
n) 0
o) 0
p) 0
q) 0

Example 2:
You can register immediately

e) 0
f) 0
g) 0
h) 0
i) 0
j) 0
k) 0
l) 0
m) 0
n) 0
o) 0
p) 0
q) 0

Example 3:
I am sorry Amy, I don't know. You can contact [redacted] for more information on City of [redacted] commercial and retail development. Call her at 608-348-9741.
Thanks much.
[Redacted]

e) 0
f) 0
g) 0
h) 0
i) 0
j) 0
k) 0
l) 0
m) 0
n) 0
o) 0

p) 0
q) 0

Example 4:
Hi Michael, I don't use Facebook, so there isn't anything written. I would be very happy to visit with you anytime. I'm at City Hall frequently, so you can set up a time to visit or talk on the telephone. Thanks, [redacted]

e) 0
f) 0
g) 0
h) 0
i) 0
j) 1
k) 0
l) 0
m) 0
n) 0
o) 0
p) 0
q) 0

Example 5:
You can register to vote at any time, must have ID with a current address and to vote in the upcoming election, one must register by October 18th. If you need registration forms or have any other questions, please call me at [redacted]. I am very glad you are planning to register, because your vote is very important.

e) 0
f) 1
g) 0
h) 1
i) 1
j) 0
k) 0
l) 0
m) 0
n) 0
o) 0
p) 0
q) 0

E. Analyses for Figures in Paper

Table A.6: Estimated Response Rates by Email Topic and Officials' Progressive Ambition using within-subject design

Progressive Ambition (from highest to lowest)	Voter Registration	Recycling	Difference between Registration & Recycling
Definitely	71.8%	70.4%	1.4
95% C.I.	(68.8, 74.9)	(67.5, 73.5)	(-4.6, 7.5)
Obs.	285	285	
Opportunity	74.3%	67.0%	7.3**
95% C.I.	(72.2, 76.4)	(64.9, 69.1)	(3.0, 11.6)
Obs.	584	584	
No Interest	68.4%	67.1%	1.3
95% C.I.	(66.6, 70.2)	(65.3, 68.9)	(-2.3, 4.9)
Obs.	983	919	
Never	70.4%	67.1%	3.3
95% C.I.	(67.6, 73.1)	(64.3, 69.9)	(-2.2, 8.9)
Obs.	362	362	

Notes: Cells in the middle two columns show estimated response rates to the two treatment conditions (Voter Registration or Recycling email) by the officials' level of progressive ambition (Definitely, Opportunity, Not Interest, or Never). The right column shows the difference in response rates to the treatment conditions. All of these estimates were calculated using a linear probability model with subject-level fixed effects to control for subject-level covariates and take advantage of the within-subject design of the experiment. We do not use a logit or probit model with fixed effects because they can produce biased estimates due to the incidental parameters problem. This is especially a concern in models with fewer than 15 observations per fixed effects (Katz 2001). In this analysis, we have just two.

** p-value<.01; * p-value<.05; ^ p-value<.10

Table A.7: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of whether Municipal Officials Thank or Encourage Constituent to Vote or Recycle by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition (Regression Results for Figure 2)

	(1)	(2)
Topic = Voter Registration	-0.017	-0.004
	[0.030]	[0.033]
	p=0.560	p=0.903
Definitely * Voter Registration	0.039	0.043
	[0.046]	[0.046]
	p=0.399	p=0.347
Opportunity * Voter Registration	0.077	0.079
	[0.039]	[0.039]
	p=0.051	p=0.044
No Interest * Voter Registration	-0.002	0.001
	[0.036]	[0.036]
	p=0.963	p=0.974
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		-0.027
		[0.026]
		p=0.306
Constant	0.220	0.220
	[0.006]	[0.006]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	4,146	4,146
Number of fixed effects	2,073	2,073
R-squared (within)	0.004	0.004

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level. DV is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official thanked or encouraged voting or recycling in the email response and 0 otherwise. We count non-responses as 0's. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated they were "never" interested in running for higher office. The coefficients on the indicator variables for the different levels of ambition are omitted because these independent variables are subsumed in the subject-level fixed effects. We avoid using logit and probit models due to the incidental parameters problem (Katz 2001). Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by each individual municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

F. Analyses of Response Length

In this section examine the overall length of responses from ambitious and non-ambitious public officials. While it could be that public officials widely use pre-written responses to common inquiries, ambition could change even the content and length of those pre-formed responses. We measured the length of the responses from elected officials in two steps. First, we employed research assistants to go through each email message and remove headers and other superfluous information, other than the email text from the municipal official. Next, we used software to generate a word count for each email message.[5] To mitigate concerns of post-treatment bias (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018), we follow Coppock's (2018) recommendations and set the word count of non-responses to zero rather than consider them missing.[6] We fit both a fixed effects model (similar to the one used in Table 3) and a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model predicting the word count by the interaction of progressive ambition and the topic of the email. The full model results are in the appendix.

We do not find any statistically significant differences in the number of words that ambitious elected officials write in response to electoral service requests than are non-ambitious elected officials. As noted in Table A.7 and Table A.8, while those who express an interest in running for higher office write slightly more words on average in their responses than those who do not express political ambition, those differences are not statistically significant. Likewise, we do not see as strong of a trend across ambition for requests for information about recycling.

5 We went through each of the email responses and cleaned up the text to ensure that the word counts are accurate.
6 Results are very similar if we exclude non-responses from the analysis. The primary difference is that the word count is on average about 60 words higher across all treatment conditions.

Table A.8: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of Response Length by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition

	(1)
Voter Registration Treatment	-2.2 [5.1] p=0.663
Definitely * Voter Registration	5.6 [8.3] p=0.500
Opportunity * Voter Registration	5.0 [6.7] p=0.455
No Interest * Voter Registration	-0.22 [5.8] p=0.968
Static Ambition * Voter Registration	-5.3 [4.5] p=0.238
Constant	48.9 [1.1] p=0.000
Observations	4,145
Number of fixed effects	2,073
R-squared (within)	0.002

Notes: Table displays coefficients from an OLS regression with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is the word count in the email response from the official. In calculating the word count of the responses, we count non-responses as zero words, consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated they were "never" interested in running for higher office. The coefficients on the indicator variables for the different levels of ambition are omitted because these independent variables are subsumed in the subject-level fixed effects. We do not use a logit or probit model with fixed effects because they can produce biased estimates due to the incidental parameters problem. This is especially a concern in models with fewer than 15 observations per fixed effect (Katz 2001). In this analysis, we have just two. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by each individual municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

Table A.9: Predicting Email Length

	Word Count (Non-Response=0)
Topic = Voter Registration	1.138
	[4.759]
Definitely * Voter Registration	0.690
	[8.259]
Opportunity* Voter Registration	-6.632
	[5.706]
No Interest * Voter Registration	-5.905
	[6.503]
Constant	48.815
	[1.101]**
Observations	4,280
Number of fixed effects	2,150
R-squared	0.002

Note: Entries are coefficients from a zero-inflated negative binomial model predicting the word count in email messages. In calculating the word count of the responses, we count non-responses as zero words, consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. All of these estimates were calculated with subject-level fixed effects to control for subject-level covariates and take advantage of the within-subject design of the experiment. Baseline categories are as follows: topic (Recycling), ambition (Never). Standard errors in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1, two-tail test.

G. Results Coding Ambition Differently

1. Response Rate

Table A.10: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of Response Rates by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition (where "Definitely" and "Opportunity" category are combined)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
Topic = Voter Registration	0.029	0.029
	[0.028]	[0.031]
	p=0.302	p=0.361
Definitely or Opportunity * Voter Registration	0.021	0.021
	[0.034]	[0.034]
	p=0.528	p=0.529
No Interest * Voter Registration	-0.026	-0.026
	[0.034]	[0.034]
	p=0.446	p=0.446
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		0.000
		[0.025]
		p=0.985
Constant	0.676	0.676
	[0.006]	[0.006]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	4,146	4,146
R-squared	0.004	0.004
Number of fixed effects	2,073	2,073

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is *Responded to Email*, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official responded to our email and 0 otherwise. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated that they would "never" be interested in running for higher office. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

Table A.11: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of Response Rates by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition (with dichotomized measure of ambition)

Coding Rule for Progressive Ambition Indicator Variable:	(1) Definitely or Opportunity = 1; No Interest or Never = 0	(2) Definitely, Opportunity, or No Interest =1; Never = 0
Topic = Voter Registration	0.028	-0.004
	[0.031]	[0.033]
	p=0.366	p=0.905
Ambition * Voter Registration	-0.003	0.033
	[0.031]	[0.033]
	p=0.921	p=0.317
Static Ambition * Voter Registration	0.001	-0.027
	[0.025]	[0.026]
	p=0.966	p=0.303
Constant	0.676	0.220
	[0.006]	[0.006]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	4,146	4,146
R-squared	0.002	0.001
Number of fixed effects	2,073	2,073

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is *Responded to Email*, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official responded to our email and 0 otherwise. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated that they would "never" be interested in running for higher office. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

2. Thanking and Encouraging

Table A.12: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of whether Municipal Officials Thank or Encourage Constituent to Vote or Recycle by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition (where "Definitely" and "Opportunity" category are combined)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
Topic = Voter Registration	-0.017	-0.003
	[0.030]	[0.033]
	p=0.560	p=0.915]
Definitely or Opportunity * Voter	0.064	0.067
Registration	[0.036]	[0.036]
	p=0.078]	p=0.064]
No Interest * Voter Registration	-0.002	0.001
	[0.036]	[0.036]
	p=0.963]	p=0.971]
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		-0.028
		[0.026]
		p=0.288
Constant	0.220	0.220
	[0.006]	[0.006]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	4,146	4,146
R-squared	0.003	0.004
Number of fixed effects	2,073	2,073

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level. DV is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official thanked or encouraged voting or recycling in the email response and 0 otherwise. We count non-responses as 0's. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated they were "never" interested in running for higher office. The coefficients on the indicator variables for the different levels of ambition are omitted because these independent variables are subsumed in the subject-level fixed effects. We avoid using logit and probit models due to the incidental parameters problem (Katz 2001). Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by each individual municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

Table A.13: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of whether Municipal Officials Thank or Encourage Constituent to Vote or Recycle by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition (with dichotomized measure of ambition)

Coding Rule for Progressive Ambition Indicator Variable:	(1) Definitely or Opportunity = 1; No Interest or Never = 0	(2) Definitely, Opportunity, or No Interest =1; Never = 0
Topic = Voter Registration	-0.003	-0.004
	[0.022]	[0.033]
	p=0.908	p=0.905
Ambition * Voter Registration	0.066	0.033
	[0.026]	[0.033]
	p=0.012	p=0.317
Static Ambition * Voter Registration	-0.028	-0.027
	[0.026]	[0.026]
	p=0.288	p=0.303
Constant	0.220	0.220
	[0.006]	[0.006]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	4,146	4,146
R-squared	0.004	0.001
Number of fixed effects	2,073	2,073

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level. DV is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official thanked or encouraged voting or recycling in the email response and 0 otherwise. We count non-responses as 0's. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated they were "never" interested in running for higher office. The coefficients on the indicator variables for the different levels of ambition are omitted because these independent variables are subsumed in the subject-level fixed effects. We avoid using logit and probit models due to the incidental parameters problem (Katz 2001). Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by each individual municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

H. Results for Officials Facing Competitive State Races

The results in this section are limited to respondents who believed that there was a 40 to 60% chance that someone like them could win their state legislative district. Results are similar if we expand the subsample to also include respondents who believed that the chance was below 40%, which nearly doubles the N to 1,772.

1. Response Rate

Table A.14: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of Response Rates by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition, limited to officials who believe they would face a competitive state legislative race

	(1)	(2)
Topic = Voter Registration	0.013	0.020
	[0.061]	[0.068]
	p=0.828	p=0.768
Definitely * Voter Registration	-0.013	-0.010
	[0.093]	[0.094]
	p=0.886	p=0.918
Opportunity * Voter Registration	0.042	0.044
	[0.075]	[0.076]
	p=0.576	p=0.562
No Interest * Voter Registration	-0.000	0.001
	[0.072]	[0.072]
	p=0.997	p=0.985
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		-0.014
		[0.052]
		p=0.786
Constant	0.674	0.674
	[0.012]	[0.012]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	968	968
R-squared (within)	0.003	0.003
Number of fixed effects	484	484

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is *Responded to Email*, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official responded to our email and 0 otherwise. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated that they would "never" be interested in running for higher office. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

Table A.15: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of Response Rates by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition (where "Definitely" and "Opportunity" category are combined), limited to officials who believe they would face a competitive state legislative race

	(1)	(2)
Topic = Voter Registration	0.013	0.021
	[0.061]	[0.068]
	p=0.828	p=0.756
Definitely or Opportunity * Voter Registration	0.026	0.028
	[0.072]	[0.072]
	p=0.722	p=0.696
No Interest * Voter Registration	-0.000	0.002
	[0.072]	[0.072]
	p=0.997	p=0.982
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		-0.016
		[0.052]
		p=0.754
Constant	0.674	0.674
	[0.012]	[0.012]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	968	968
R-squared	0.002	0.003
Number of fixed effects	484	484

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is *Responded to Email*, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official responded to our email and 0 otherwise. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated that they would "never" be interested in running for higher office. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

In this next table, we measure progressive ambition based on whether the official indicated whether they would be interested in running for office in state government (=1) or not (=0). This question followed the progressive ambition question used as the main independent variable in the other analyses.

Table A.16: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of Response Rates by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition for State Office, limited to officials who believe they would face a competitive state legislative race

	(1)	(2)
Topic = Voter Registration	0.034	-0.010
	[0.036]	[0.047]
	p=0.346	p=0.836
Ambition for State Office* Voter	0.053	0.050
Registration	[0.055]	[0.056]
	p=0.344	p=0.373
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		0.074
		[0.056]
		p=0.188
Constant	0.208	0.208
	[0.014]	[0.014]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	954	954
R-squared	0.011	0.014
Number of fixed effects	477	477

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is *Responded to Email*, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official responded to our email and 0 otherwise. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated that they were not interested in running for office in state government. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

2. Thanking and Encouraging

Table A.17: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of whether Municipal Officials Thank or Encourage Constituent to Vote or Recycle by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition, limited to officials who believe they would face a competitive state legislative race

	(1)	(2)
Topic = Voter Registration	0.000	-0.029
	[0.066]	[0.072]
	p=1.000	p=0.693
Definitely * Voter Registration	0.093	0.077
	[0.093]	[0.094]
	p=0.319	p=0.411
Opportunity * Voter Registration	0.079	0.071
	[0.085]	[0.086]
	p=0.353	p=0.407
No Interest * Voter Registration	0.061	0.054
	[0.077]	[0.078]
	p=0.429	p=0.484
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		0.060
		[0.056]
		p=0.286
Constant	0.205	0.205
	[0.014]	[0.014]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	968	968
R-squared (within)	0.012	0.015
Number of fixed effects	484	484

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level. DV is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official thanked or encouraged voting or recycling in the email response and 0 otherwise. We count non-responses as 0's. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated they were "never" interested in running for higher office. The coefficients on the indicator variables for the different levels of ambition are omitted because these independent variables are subsumed in the subject-level fixed effects. We avoid using logit and probit models due to the incidental parameters problem (Katz 2001). Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by each individual municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

Table A.18: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of whether Municipal Officials Thank or Encourage Constituent to Vote or Recycle by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition (where "Definitely" and "Opportunity" category are combined), limited to officials who believe they would face a competitive state legislative race

	(1)	(2)
Topic = Voter Registration	0.000	-0.029
	[0.065]	[0.072]
	p=1.000	p=0.692
Definitely or Opportunity * Voter	0.083	0.073
Registration	[0.078]	[0.079]
	p=0.288	p=0.356
No Interest * Voter Registration	0.061	0.054
	[0.077]	[0.078]
	p=0.429	p=0.484
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		0.060
		[0.056]
		[0.282
Constant	0.205	0.205
	[0.014]	[0.014]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	968	968
R-squared	0.012	0.015
Number of fixed effects	484	484

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level. DV is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official thanked or encouraged voting or recycling in the email response and 0 otherwise. We count non-responses as 0's. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated they were "never" interested in running for higher office. The coefficients on the indicator variables for the different levels of ambition are omitted because these independent variables are subsumed in the subject-level fixed effects. We avoid using logit and probit models due to the incidental parameters problem (Katz 2001). Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by each individual municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

In this next table, we measure progressive ambition based on whether the official indicated whether they would be interested in running for office in state government (=1) or not (=0). This question followed the progressive ambition question used as the main independent variable in the other analyses.

Table A.19: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of whether Municipal Officials Thank or Encourage Constituent to Vote or Recycle by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition for State Office, limited to officials who believe they would face a competitive state legislative race

	(1)	(2)
Topic = Voter Registration	0.034	-0.010
	[0.036]	[0.047]
	p=0.346	p=0.836
Ambition for State Office* Voter	0.053	0.050
Registration	[0.055]	[0.056]
	p=0.344	p=0.373
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		0.074
		[0.056]
		p=0.188
Constant	0.208	0.208
	[0.014]	[0.014]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	954	954
R-squared	0.011	0.014
Number of fixed effects	477	477

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level. DV is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official thanked or encouraged voting or recycling in the email response and 0 otherwise. We count non-responses as 0's. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated that they were not interested in running for office in state government. The coefficients on the indicator variables for the different levels of ambition are omitted because these independent variables are subsumed in the subject-level fixed effects. We avoid using logit and probit models due to the incidental parameters problem (Katz 2001). Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by each individual municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

I. Examining Covariates of Progressive Political Ambition

We hypothesize a moderating influence of progressive ambition on the relationship between the topic of the email the elected official receives and their responsiveness to these emails. We do not experimentally induce ambition, so we cannot be certain that any effects we find are the result of ambition motivating the observed differences in responsiveness and not something else. In this section, we present similar models to those utilized in the text; replacing ambition with possible confounding variables we have in the dataset that predict ambition (Dynes, Hassell, and Miles 2018) to alleviate concerns that some other factor might be driving the results in the paper. We note that none of the interactions are statistically significant.

Table A.20: Previous Election was Close

	(1) Responded
Won previous election by 5% pts. or less (1=yes)	-
Voter Registration	0.034 [0.012]** p=0.005
Won previous election by 5% pts. or less * Voter Registration	-0.006 [0.039] p=0.885
Constant	0.674 [0.006]** p=0.000
Observations	4,294
Number of fe	2,147
R-squared	0.004

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.21: Perceived Probability of Winning the Legislative Seat

	(1) Responded
Probability similar candidate could win state legislative seat (Scale from 0 to = 100)	-
Voter Registration	0.039 [0.029] p=0.186
Probability of Winning * Voter Registration	-0.000 [0.000] p=0.732
Constant	0.684 [0.006]** p=0.000
Observations	3,912
Number of fixed effects	1,956
R-squared	0.003

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.22: Perceived Probability Similar Candidate Could Win

	(1) Responded
Probability current seat filled by similar candidate (Scale from 0 to 100)	-
Voter Registration	0.052 [0.035] p=0.133
Probability of Similar Candidate Winning * Voter Registration	-0.000 [0.001] p=0.520
Constant	0.681 [0.006]** p=0.000
Observations	4,052
Number of fixed effects	2,026
R-squared	0.004

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.23: Anticipated Length in Current Office

	(1) Responded
Anticipated length in current office (in years.)	-
Voter Registration	0.027 [0.024] p=0.258
Anticipated Length in Office * Voter Registration	0.000 [0.002] p=0.834
Constant	0.678 [0.006]** p=0.000
Observations	4,136
Number of fixed effects	2,068
R-squared	0.003

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.24: Tenure in Current Office

	(1) Responded
Tenure (years in current office)	-
Voter Registration	0.040 [0.020]* p=0.045
Tenure * Voter Registration	-0.001 [0.002] p=0.667
Constant	0.674 [0.006]** p=0.000
Observations	4,246
Number of fixed effects	2,123
R-squared	0.004

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.25: Term Limits

	(1) Responded
Term limits exist for current office (1=yes)	-
Voter Registration	0.038 [0.013]** p=0.004
Term Limits * Voter Registration	-0.014 [0.029] p=0.632
Constant	0.673 [0.006]** p=0.000
Observations	4,310
Number of fixed effects	2,155
R-squared	0.004

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.26: City Population

	(1) Responded
Log of Population	-
Voter Registration	0.017 [0.070] p=0.812
Log of Population * Voter Registration	0.002 [0.007] p=0.803
Constant	0.662 [0.005]** p=0.000
Observations	5,478
Number of fixed effects	2,739
R-squared	0.004

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.27: City Has a Manager Form of Government

	(1) Responded
Manager Form of Government (1=yes)	-
Voter Registration	0.025 [0.014]^ p=0.076
Manager Form of Government * Voter Registration	0.011 [0.022] p=0.627
Constant	0.664 [0.005]** p=0.000
Observations	5,010
Number of fixed effects	2,505
R-squared	0.003

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.28: City Has a Mayor Form of Government

	(1) Responded
Mayor Form of Government (1=yes)	-
Voter Registration	0.032 [0.015]* p=0.034
Mayor Form of Government * Voter Registration	-0.007 [0.021] p=0.733
Constant	0.664 [0.005]** p=0.000
Observations	5,010
Number of fixed effects	2,505
R-squared	0.003

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.29: City Has Partisan Elections

	(1) Responded
Partisan elections (1=yes)	-
Voter Registration	0.042 [0.013]** p=0.002
Partisan elections * Voter Registration	-0.025 [0.027] p=0.673
Constant	0.673 [0.006]** p=0.000
Observations	4,312
Number of fixed effects	2,156
R-squared	0.005

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.30: Gender

	(1) Responded
Gender (male)	-
Voter Registration	0.045 [0.020]** p=0.025
Gender * Voter Registration	-0.017 [0.025] p=0.504
Constant	0.711 [0.006]** p=0.000
Observations	4,183
Number of fixed effects	1,907
R-squared	0.002

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.31: Big Five Personality Traits

	(1) Responded	(2) Responded	(3) Responded	(4) Responded	(5) Responded	(6) Responded
Personality Trait	--	--	--	--	--	--
Voter	0.035	-0.043	0.014	0.102	-0.045	0.17
Registration	[0.039]	[0.061]	[0.035]	[0.059]	[0.039]	[0.088]
Openness *	-0.007					-0.003
Voter Registration	[0.018]					[0.018]
Conscientiousness *		0.024				0.025
Voter Registration		[0.023]				[0.024]
Extraversion *			0.002			-0.005
Voter Registration			[0.017]			[0.018]
Agreeableness *				-0.035		-0.055
Voter Registration				[0.025]		[0.026]*
Emotional Stability *					0.028	0.038
Voter Registration					[0.017]	[0.018]*
Constant	0.709	0.709	0.710	0.710	0.710	0.710
	[0.006]**	[0.006]**	[0.006]**	[0.006]**	[0.006]**	[0.006]**
Observations	4,174	4,162	4,159	4,180	4,162	4,046
Number of fixed effects	1,919	1,914	1,914	1,921	1,916	1,862
R-squared	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.005

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is listed in the column label. Each is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official stated this in the email response and 0 otherwise. In this coding, we count non-responses as not thanking and not encouraging (or 0's), consistent with Coppock's (2018) recommendation to avoid post treatment conditioning. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

J. Controlling for Email Wave

Table A.32: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of Response Rates by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition

	(1)	(2)
Voter Registration Treatment	0.029	0.028
	[0.028]	[0.032]
	p=0.311	p=0.374
Definitely * Voter Registration	-0.022	-0.022
	[0.043]	[0.043]
	p=0.612	p=0.610
Opportunity * Voter Registration	0.041	0.041
	[0.036]	[0.036]
	p=0.256	p=0.256
No Interest * Voter Registration	-0.025	-0.026
	[0.034]	[0.034]
	p=0.450	p=0.448
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		0.001
		[0.025]
		[0.966
Email Wave 2	-0.033	-0.033
	[0.016]	[0.016]
	p=0.046	p=0.046
Email Wave 3	-0.020	-0.020
	[0.017]	[0.017]
	p=0.241	p=0.243
Constant	0.694	0.694
	[0.011]	[0.011]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	4,146	4,146
R-squared (within)	0.007	0.007
Number of fixed effects	2,073	2,073

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level where dependent variable is *Responded to Email*, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official responded to our email and 0 otherwise. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated that they would "never" be interested in running for higher office. Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

Table A.33: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of whether Municipal Officials Thank or Encourage Constituent to Vote or Recycle by Email Topic and Progressive Ambition

	(1)	(2)
Voter Registration Treatment	-0.017	-0.004
	[0.030]	[0.033]
	p=0.567	p=0.907
Definitely * Voter Registration	0.039	0.043
	[0.046]	[0.046]
	p=0.402	p=0.351
Opportunity * Voter Registration	0.077	0.080
	[0.039]	[0.039]
	p=0.049	p=0.042
No Interest * Voter Registration	-0.002	0.001
	[0.036]	[0.036]
	p=0.960	p=0.977
Static Ambition * Voter Registration		-0.027
		[0.026]
		p=0.311
Email Wave 2	0.010	0.010
	[0.018]	[0.018]
	p=0.578	p=0.596
Email Wave 3	0.003	0.003
	[0.019]	[0.019]
	p=0.859	p=0.880
Constant	0.215	0.216
	[0.013]	[0.013]
	p=0.000	p=0.000
Observations	4,146	4,146
R-squared (within)	0.004	0.004
Number of fixed effects	2,073	2,073

Notes: Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model with fixed effects at the subject-level. DV is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official thanked or encouraged voting or recycling in the email response and 0 otherwise. We count non-responses as 0's. The baseline conditions are the recycling treatment and subjects who indicated that they were not interested in running for office in state government. The coefficients on the indicator variables for the different levels of ambition are omitted because these independent variables are subsumed in the subject-level fixed effects. We avoid using logit and probit models due to the incidental parameters problem (Katz 2001). Standard errors are shown in brackets and clustered by each individual municipal official. Two-tailed p-values are shown under the standard errors.

K. Analysis of Response to Either Email

In this section, we examine whether more ambitious officials just respond at higher rates to both types of emails, the voter registration question or the recycling question. We fail to find evidence that they do regardless of the control variables or coding of progressive ambition we use. If anything, those with higher levels of ambition are respond at overall lower rates than those with the lowest level of expressed progressive ambition.

Table A.34: Variables Predicting Whether Officials Responded to Either Email

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ambition: No Interest	-0.059	-0.063	-0.062
	[0.032]^	[0.032]*	[0.032]^
Ambition: Opportunity	-0.045	-0.049	-0.049
	[0.035]	[0.034]	[0.035]
Ambition: Definitely	-0.022	-0.030	-0.019
	[0.039]	[0.039]	[0.040]
Email Topic: Voter Registration	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Email Wave = 2	-0.043	-0.041	-0.044
	[0.020]*	[0.020]*	[0.020]*
Email Wave = 3	-0.032	-0.030	-0.034
	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.021]^
Log of Population		0.020	0.023
		[0.009]*	[0.010]*
Mayoral Form of Gov't (1=yes)		-0.021	-0.017
		[0.022]	[0.022]
% Pop. Minority		-0.098	-0.094
		[0.059]^	[0.059]
% Pop. w/ Some College or More		0.080	0.097
		[0.207]	[0.215]
Median Income (in 2012 $10k)		0.004	0.004
		[0.005]	[0.005]
% Pop. Homeowners		0.353	0.294
		[0.285]	[0.286]
Static Ambition (1=yes)			0.025
			[0.022]
Mayor (1=yes)			0.043
			[0.028]
Term limits exist for current office (1=yes)			-0.010
			[0.027]
Won previous election by 5% pts. or less (1=yes)			-0.044
			[0.037]
Partisan elections (1=yes)			-0.008
			[0.029]
Tenure (years in current office)			-0.004
			[0.002]^
Probability current seat filled by similar candidate (Scale from 0 to 100)			0.001
			[0.001]
Probability similar candidate could win state legislative seat (Scale from 0 to			-0.001
			[0.000]
Official's ideology (1=Lib., 7=Cons.)			0.000
			[0.010]
Democrat (1=yes)			-0.055
			[0.031]^
Republican (1=yes)			-0.045
			[0.029]
Gender (Female)			0.052
			[0.024]*
Big 5: Openness			0.016
			[0.017]
Big 5: Conscientiousness			0.023
			[0.024]
Big 5: Extraversion			-0.026
			[0.016]
Big 5: Agreeableness			0.031
			[0.024]
Big 5: Emotional Stability			-0.008
			[0.018]
Constant	0.783	0.528	0.423
	[0.031]**	[0.109]**	[0.145]**
Observations	2,394	2,394	2,394
R-squared	0.004	0.013	0.030

Notes: OLS regression. DV is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official responded to our email and 0 otherwise. Excluded ambition category is "Never." Standard errors, clustered at official-level, are in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Table A.34: Variables Predicting Whether Officials Thank or Encourage Constituent to Vote or Recycle in Either Email

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ambition: No Interest	-0.032	-0.036	-0.031
	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]
Ambition: Opportunity	0.033	0.031	0.036
	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.031]
Ambition: Definitely	-0.005	-0.010	-0.004
	[0.033]	[0.034]	[0.035]
Email Topic: Voter Registration	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.017]
Email Wave = 2	-0.002	-0.000	-0.001
	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Email Wave = 3	0.010	0.012	0.011
	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Log of Population		0.006	0.006
		[0.007]	[0.007]
Mayoral Form of Gov't (1=yes)		-0.053	-0.053
		[0.018]**	[0.018]**
% Pop. Minority		0.002	-0.004
		[0.048]	[0.050]
% Pop. w/ Some College or More		-0.178	-0.163
		[0.178]	[0.186]
Median Income (in 2012 $10k)		0.002	0.001
		[0.004]	[0.005]
% Pop. Homeowners		0.202	0.220
		[0.233]	[0.241]
Static Ambition (1=yes)			0.006
			[0.018]
Mayor (1=yes)			0.027
			[0.023]
Term limits exist for current office (1=yes)			-0.032
			[0.021]
Won previous election by 5% pts. or less (1=yes)			0.055
			[0.032]^
Partisan elections (1=yes)			-0.016
			[0.022]
Tenure (years in current office)			-0.001
			[0.001]
Probability current seat filled by similar candidate (Scale from 0 to 100)			0.000
			[0.000]
Probability similar candidate could win state legislative seat (Scale from 0 to			-0.000
			[0.000]
Official's ideology (1=Lib., 7=Cons.)			0.002
			[0.008]
Democrat (1=yes)			0.026
			[0.026]
Republican (1=yes)			0.021
			[0.024]
Gender (Female)			0.028
			[0.021]
Big 5: Openness			-0.001
			[0.014]
Big 5: Conscientiousness			0.006
			[0.019]
Big 5: Extraversion			0.007
			[0.013]
Big 5: Agreeableness			0.006
			[0.019]
Big 5: Emotional Stability			-0.005
			[0.014]
Constant	0.243	0.208	0.141
	[0.029]**	[0.085]*	[0.120]
Observations	2,394	2,394	2,394
R-squared	0.004	0.010	0.016

Notes: OLS regression. DV is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the municipal official thanked or encouraged voting or recycling in the email response and 0 otherwise. Excluded ambition category is "Never." Standard errors, clustered at official-level, are in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.1

Appendix References

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